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This book is about how robots and artificial intelligence will completely transform
working life. Once the dust has settled from the Fourth Industrial Revolution,
workplaces and professions will be unrecognizable. A new class is seeing the light
of day: the precariat. We will live side by side with the ‘working poor’ – people
who have several jobs, but still can’t make ends meet. There will be a small
salaried élite consisting of innovation and knowledge workers. Workplaces will be
unrecognizable. Robots will have destroyed bureaucratic hierarchies and torn apart
the middle classes. What will remain will be contract workers with insecure jobs.
We are seeing the emergence of a new class of pyjama-workers – people who can
do their jobs in bed or alternatively at a café table. Slightly further into the future,
we can see a major transformation in professional environments. Doctors will be
medical engineers, nurses will be nursing assistants accompanied by robots.
Teachers will be replaced by robots and holograms. And taking this scenario
further, we see the downfall of the great dinosaurs. Metaphorically speaking, major
hospitals may in these robotized times metaphorically be seen as ‘burger-van
hospitals’, where robots diagnose, prescribe and make surgical interventions. If
decision-makers stick their heads in the sand like ostriches, the sandstorm will
bury the ostriches so that they never get their tiny heads out of the sand.
Our challenges and problems are not linked to finding solutions to the
consequences of robots and artificial intelligence. What is difficult is to discard
our engrained ways of understanding the concepts of work, casual labour, being
at one’s workplace, and everything that is linked to the ways in which the
industrial society organizes and manages work. Those woodchips you got from
the oak you sawed down: can’t you glue them back together to resurrect the old
tree? The point of this metaphor is that what is gone is still present in our
collective memory, and that is what is difficult to change.
Although the industrial society caused the middle classes to grow and live in
greater comfort, there is much to suggest that the Fourth Industrial Revolution
will decimate the middle classes.

1 The workplace of the future
Introduction
This chapter is intended as a roadmap to explain what lies ahead for businesses
and institutions, given the development of robots, informats and artificial
intelligence.
We know that most jobs will change extremely rapidly. Until now, people who
are educated have been able to find jobs. In the future, many people will not find
jobs even though they are educated (Kessler, 2017). It seems likely that most
jobs will be those either at the bottom or the top of the wage scale.1
Robots,2 artificial intelligence and informats3 are destroying bureaucracies and
hierarchies. This hypothesis is based on the research of Abd (2017), Wilson
(2017), Ross (2016), and Susskind and Susskind (2015).
The second hypothesis on which this chapter is based is as follows: robots and
informatization are transferring surpluses from income from employment to
investment income. A good deal of empirical research supports this hypothesis.4
The hypothesis reveals a paradox: productivity increases, the level of innova-
tion increases, but at the same time average salary levels decline (McAffee &
Brynjolfsson, 2017).
In the USA, it is projected that 50 per cent of today’s workplaces will be
automated and robotized over the next 20 years (Avent, 2016: 1–4). Robotization
will take place in all occupations: journalism, teaching, medicine, defence,
architecture, dentistry, the service sector, transport, the merchant navy, market-
ing, industry, etc. (McAffee & Brynjolfsson, 2017). The last major period of
automation affected jobs in industry, during which a combination of industrial
robots and global wage competition decimated millions of industrial jobs and
transferred many jobs from high-cost countries to low-cost countries. It appears
that the next round of automation will affect jobs in the service sector. According
to two Oxford professors who conducted a major study of more than 700
different service-sector occupations, half of all jobs in the American service
sector are in danger of disappearing (Frey & Osborne, 2013). Although robot-
ization is transforming most workplaces, it is also leading to fewer work-related
injuries, fewer traffic accidents, better medical diagnostics, and higher quality
medical and surgical interventions. Robotization will improve the everyday
quality of life of sick and disabled people and those who are otherwise in need of
care. Deaf people will also find their everyday lives improved by new nano-
robots and other disabled people will experience improvements. According to
Ross (2016: 42), robotization is a global net benefit.5
In an organization such as described above, the old ‘hamster-wheel mentality’
will be replaced by the flexibility of the panther and the feeding instinct. All
panther-type organizations will be directly engaged in competition for customers,
not only those organizations that are in immediate contact with customers
(Susskind & Susskind, 2015). Workers in these organizations may be described
as knowledge workers and innovation workers. They will have completed a
long series of specialized educational programmes, including Master’s degrees
and doctorates (Trot, 2015: 23; Wilson, 2017).
In a panther-type organization, everyone will be committed, motivated and
focused on the customers. These are ‘the survivors’ in the organizations of the
future. However, those who do not adopt this attitude will quickly fall by the
wayside. In order for the organization to do what it is designed to do, it will be
dependent on buying or leasing in many functions. These functions will be
performed by the new contract workers, the same people who were employed
previously in the organization and existed within its bureaucracy and hierarchy
(Shipler, 2005). These people will now be ‘in-sourced’ by the organization on
short- or long-term contracts. These new-style organizations may be ‘the com-
pany of one' (Lane, 2011). These will be people who have a high level of
expertise within one or a small number of areas, which they sell to one or more
businesses. Metaphorically speaking, we might envisage a swarm of insects
around a honey pot. These insects compete on cost and expertise in order to
land contracts with businesses. We can envisage wage competition strongly
depressing the price of their labour because people who want to sell their
cutting-edge expertise to businesses can be found everywhere in the global
economy (Banki, 2015). Geographical proximity will no longer be a factor
when seeking a high level of competence combined with good availability and
reliability at the lowest possible cost (Garud et al., 2002; Gaskarth, 2015). The
people who will tend increasingly to sell their expertise to businesses through
temporary contracts will be members of what is known as the precariat6
(Standing, 2014a, 2014b). The precariat is a direct and intentional consequence
of neoliberal economic ideology (Banki, 2015; Johnson, 2015b: 1).
From the 1970s onwards, the new ideology was dominated by flexibility and
competition, which gradually came to permeate all aspects of the social system
(Standing, 2014a: 1). Accordingly, risk and insecurity became part of employees’
everyday lives. According to Standing (2014a: 1–4), this development means that
millions of workers around the world no longer have stable employment
prospects – the neoliberal agenda has created a political monster.
Members of the precariat perform insecure jobs. According to Standing
(2014a: 1–4), the precariat is a specific social class that is developing worldwide.
Many of its members are frustrated, angry and bitter at the élite who have put
them in the positions in which they find themselves.
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In the working life of the future, many, indeed very many, people – some
estimates suggest 30–40 per cent of the workforce – will lose their jobs (Shipler,
2005; Wacquant, 2009a, 2009b). These people are referred to as the working
poor (Shipler, 2005). This group consists of low-paid service workers and people
on welfare benefits, to mention some groups (Shipler, 2005).
The new panther organizations will be extremely cost-effective and have very
high levels of productivity (Murphy, 2016). They will also be good at problem-
solving, have little staff turnover, and have creative and satisfied employees (Boxall
& Purcell, 2010). These very well-paid employees will find their work meaningful.
They will be living out their dreams in the panther organizations, and will have
contacts among the precariat who can perform short-term contractual assignments
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011, 2014). This kind of relationship will contribute to
securing the future of ‘the company of one’. Within a panther organization, the
employees will flourish using their expertise to perform their specialized knowledge
tasks (Bruce & Crook, 2015). These employees will be optimistic, positive indivi-
duals who will spend much of their working lives in contact with their global
competence networks (Reinmoell & Reinmoeller, 2015). Those who do not succeed
in making this transformation will have been forced to leave the organization and
will number among either the precariat or the working poor.
Knowledge workers and innovation workers will be the relatively privileged
employees in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Murphy, 2016; Trot, 2015: 23).
Murphy has, however, omitted the people who missed the bus: the working poor
and the precariat. To make this kind of organization possible, with robots taking
over many job-related functions and making decisions based on efficient algo-
rithms and artificial intelligence, many or perhaps most people will have to spend
most of their ‘working lives’ outside such organizations, existing as sub-contrac-
tors working on insecure contracts (Standing, 2014a; Johnson, 2015b).
What is happening at the dawn of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is a total
transformation of the nature of income-generating work (Gans, 2016). The
driving forces behind this transformation are robotization, informatization, artifi-
cial intelligence, and an extreme focus on cost-efficiency due to global competi-
tion and growing individualization (Savage, 2015; Wilson, 2017).
The main question that we are exploring in this chapter is as follows: How
does the workplace of the future constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution?
In order to respond to this main research question, we have broken it down
into three sub-questions:
1. How does the precariat constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution?
2. How do the working poor constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial
Revolution?
3. How do knowledge workers and innovation workers constitute an aspect of
the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
This introduction is visualized in Figure 1.1, which also illustrates how we
have structured this chapter.
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The precariat
Description
In his research, Guy Standing (2014a, 2014b) has identified a new class that he calls
the precariat, which has emerged through globalization, liberalization, and increas-
ing robotization and digitization. This class has the potential to change how
businesses are organized in the future and how societies develop (Johnson, 2015b:
1–4). Many activist groups from the precariat have fought for better working
conditions, and both pay and job security, so they can plan the future for themselves
and their families better (De Sario, 2007: 21–39; Tarrow, 2005; Johnson, 2015b).
The precariat, as the term is used here, is associated with Standing’s research
(2014a, 2014b), the studies carried out by Johnson (2015a) in Italy and Arnold’s
studies (Arnold, 2013) of insecure work in Vietnam. Furthermore, we also refer
to the studies of Armano and Murgia (2015) of work flexibilization in the USA,
as well as Ross’s (2009) studies of insecure work in the USA. In addition, we
refer to Lodovici and Semenza’s (2012) studies of high-skilled youth in Europe
who, despite their higher education, have insecure work and expectations of
insecurity in future work relations.
We have developed a typology of the precariat in order to gain a better under-
standing of this phenomenon. We have divided the precariat into four types. We
term the first type the underemployed. These are people with a good education
and relatively long experience from working life. They are exposed to competition
in the global economy and threatened by robotization, so their wages are pushed
downwards (Arnold & Bongiovi, 2013: 290). The feeling of being excluded makes
these people feel frustrated, alienated and angry (Johnson, 2015b). The under-
employed are hired on short-term contracts depending on the company’s needs.
The examples here are many. For instance, an underemployed person could be a
young legal professional who takes on extra jobs in the hope of getting a
permanent job, but is not rewarded for his or her extra efforts. He or she must
















Figure 1.1 A typology of working life in the future.
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does become available there are hundreds of applicants for the position, who have
also taken on extra jobs in order to gain recognition (Standing, 2014a: 33–34).
The second type is a young person with a relatively good education, but who only
has temporary underpaid jobs. These young people are skilled but have not had the
opportunity to gain experience in the sector relevant to their education. They have
been told that it pays to get an education. Consequently, they have completed so-
called mid-level higher education, often up to a Bachelor’s degree. However, after
completing their education they encounter a job market where they are unable to find
regular well-paid jobs. We call this type the underpaid. These workers are also
frustrated and angry, because they had expectations of a good job after graduation,
but encountered a reality that was different from what they had been told to expect.
Their anger may be explained as a crisis of expectation, i.e. the promises that these
people are given when they work extra are merely a fata morgana – a mirage, an
imaginary hope of a permanent job – because it is more profitable for companies to
hire people on short-term contracts than to give them permanent positions.
However, despair does not necessarily lead to political action – it might just as
well lead to passivity and apathy. On the other hand, Standing (2014a: viii) says
that the rebellion lies in the self-awareness of the precariat as a class: ‘Across the
world, there is an energy building around the precariat.’
The third category is made up of people with specialist expertise, often at the
Master’s or PhD level. These people may have had well-paid jobs before being
rendered superfluous by robotization, automation, flexibilization, digitization, infor-
matization and so on (Garud et al., 2002). Such people often establish their own
businesses: ‘the company of one’ (Lane, 2011). They use these businesses to sell
their expertise to larger organizations. We refer to these people as knowledge
entrepreneurs. In general, these people are satisfied with their entrepreneurial
situations. They are hired on short-term contracts by larger companies, large
consultancies or organizations in the public sector. Although knowledge entrepre-
neurs have a sense of independence and freedom in their daily lives, their incomes
are insecure (Lane, 2011: 13–23). They exist like operators of small coastal fishing
boats off northern or western Norway. They sit alone in their little boats with their
insecure incomes, but none the less they feel that they are leading free and
independent lives (Johannessen, 1979). Rates of pay for knowledge entrepreneurs
vary, but in general they will earn less than they would have done as permanent
employees of the same organizations. Example of knowledge entrepreneurs include
IT experts and software engineers. These people tend to work for large organizations
on six-month contracts that can be terminated at just a few weeks’ notice.
We term the fourth type vagabond workers. These workers may be migrants
and people with disabilities. They are skilled and educated and differ from ‘the
working poor’. On the whole, the vagabond workers are satisfied with their
working life, because their part-time jobs are better than what they had before.
Migrants are often happy to be given the opportunity to get a foothold in their
new country; for instance, an engineer from Syria who gets a taxi-driving job,
the nurse from Iran who works the nightshift at a hotel or the lawyer who gets a
short-term job at a slaughterhouse. In this way, part-time contracts can provide
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migrants with a qualitatively better life. As mentioned, this type also includes
people with various disabilities who previously had no work experience but who
can now do a meaningful job, although their income might be low; for instance,
someone who is visually impaired working in a call centre, and so on.
The four categories of the precariat have in common that their jobs are
temporary and insecure, and they are under pressure with regard to rates of pay
and employment rights. They also feel alienated.7 Quite simply, they feel that
their future not only is insecure, but has also been destroyed. The precariat also
fear moving down the social ladder to the working poor.
The precariat is not yet a class with a shared ideology. Rather it is made up of
isolated individuals who sit on the side-lines of society peering into a world
populated by successful people, by the salaried éite – a world where people can
plan their futures. This successful élite envisages this new class encroaching on
to their manicured lawns, and accordingly they remain obedient to the govern-
ment in accordance with the principle of protecting the future.8
All members of the precariat struggle to obtain steady full-time work. They
also work long hours unpaid to show keenness to the employer, with the hope of
being preferred if a full-time permanent job becomes available (which it rarely
does). Speaking metaphorically, we might say it is easier for a member of the
precariat to win the lottery than to obtain a secure, well-paid, full-time job with good
prospects. In addition, most members of the precariat9 lack a sense of solidarity with
others in the precariat, the trade union movement or a political party. They feel
themselves to be excluded by most established institutions. According to Standing,
their basic attitude is ‘fuck politics’.10 Members of the precariat do not see
themselves as a social class. They have no collective aims, but simply struggle to
make ends meet. It is only when they gain class consciousness as a separate social
class that they will come to change the social system (Standing, 2014a: 1–4).
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Figure 1.2 A typology of the precariat.
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The underemployed
The underemployed go in and out of temporary jobs, and their rights in the
labour market are very insecure. They are unable to find jobs that match their
education, resulting in existential insecurity (Coates & Morrison, 2016: 134–
167). Their broken dreams make them frustrated, angry and at times aggressive.
In this frustration lies rebellion, according to Standing (2014a: vii).
Today the proportion of young people with higher education is much greater
than in the past. Despite this, Trot (2015: 25–26) says that young people cannot
expect to find a job that matches their education. They also have difficulty finding a
job they think is meaningful (Coates & Morrison, 2016: 116–134). If and when
they get a job, it’s often based on a temporary contract and poorly paid.11
It seems to be the case that it is the relatively highly educated, rather than
those with little education, who experience the greatest uncertainty in finding a
job and job security (Armano & Murgia, 2015: 106). For instance, 40 per cent of
the graduates in Spain are in poorly paid jobs one year after graduating
(Standing, 2014a: 67). The new generation of European university graduates
have not been able to realize the future they had envisioned at the outset of their
studies (Mason, 2012: 71). They have also taken out loans which they had
planned to pay back when finding a job after graduating; this proves difficult
when their present income is much lower than they had planned for (Standing,
2014a: 68). This frustration easily leads to anger and rebellion against the
establishment (Mason, 2012: 71–80), i.e. the political, economic, intellectual
and cultural élite. These indebted students on low incomes also belong to the
emerging group of debt-laden home owners. One of the consequences of the
situation described is the obedient and disciplined worker hired on a part-time
basis and on contract (Lazzarato, 2012: 7).
You’re free as long as you can pay your debts, writes Lazzarato (2012: 31).
Thus, the underemployed are willing to do any jobs that are available (Coates
& Morrison, 2016: 187–217). Those who are highly educated are also willing
to do non-paying jobs, so they can get a ‘foot inside the door’ of large
companies – for instance, by means of non-paid or poorly paid ‘internships’
(Perlin, 2011: 36). These young people had been promised that when they
graduated their dreams would be realized (Ainley, 2016: 1–3). In other words,
they have been grossly misled; one might even say that a whole generation has
been deceived, says Ainley (2016). If and when these young people are given
contracts, they are often of only a few months’ duration. When their contract
runs out, they have to go back to the unemployment office (Armano & Murgia,
2015: 102).
These highly educated young people see their expectations shattered. Although
their contracts may give them a high degree of autonomy, their future income is
uncertain. Consequently, one might characterize this autonomy as ‘fake auton-
omy’ (Armano & Murgia, 2015: 106). This may be explained by the fact that
these workers have limited access to welfare benefits, because these benefits are
often dependent on being permanently employed.
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The underpaid
Every country in the world has its underpaid workers. In the USA, many of the
underpaid can be found in the Rust Belt. Historically, these workers can trace
their roots back to the days of the New Deal. The lives of these workers have
become insecure through work flexibilization, which is a direct consequence of
globalization. The underpaid in the American Rust Belt have been unable to
compete with the lower wages of Chinese and Mexican workers. Consequently,
jobs in the Rust Belt have disappeared or become insecure. At the same time, the
power of the unions has been diminished (Varga, 2015: 46). Similar develop-
ments have also been taking place in all the other industrialized countries from
the 1970s onwards.
Through globalization, the underpaid have joined the ranks of the precariat.
They feel betrayed by the political and financial élite. They are desperate and
angry, but have nobody else to vent their frustration and anger on than the élite,
who have warmly expounded on the benefits of globalization, free trade agree-
ments, and the free flow of capital and labour. Among others, this concerns
workers in the American Rust Belt, Wales, Greece, Spain, Italy, France and other
countries (Abrahamson, 2004). The underpaid can also be found in the service
sector in big cities (Abrahamson, 2004: 49); their wages have been forced down
in the competitive world of globalization. These workers are often immigrants or
domestic migrants who take poorly paid jobs. In the EU, social dumping has
greatly contributed to swelling the ranks of the underpaid.
The knowledge entrepreneurs
The third type in our precariat typology is the knowledge entrepreneurs. These are
people with a higher education, but who cannot get or do not wish for permanent
employment (Ikonen, 2015: 84). They belong to the so-called ‘self-employed
society’ (Ainley, 2016: 38). They often have short-term contracts, making their
conditions of employment temporary and uncertain (Du Gay & Morgan, 2004).
They are freelancers who are independent and work whenever they want or need
to. As a rule they don’t belong to a trade union. In the USA alone, this group of
workers constitutes as many as 54 million people.12 There are many websites that
cater to the employment needs of freelancers, such as Field Nation, Upwork,
HourlyNerd, Toptal, Work Market and PwC Talent Exchange, to name just a few.13
Many of the knowledge entrepreneurs can be found in big cities (Abrahamson,
2004: 49), where they often operate as ‘the company of one’ (Lane, 2011). As a
rule, they are often employed on temporary and insecure contracts. Their dreams
are often linked to becoming innovation workers and knowledge workers, and
hopefully thus becoming one of the salaried élite (Standing, 2014b: 14). Becom-
ing a knowledge worker or innovation worker is the knowledge entrepreneur’s
opportunity for upward social mobility.
On the personal level, the uncertainty of contract work requires a great deal of
stamina and self-discipline (Ikonen, 2015: 83–90). The hypothesis is that the
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more insecure and less predictable the future, the more people will aim to
become knowledge entrepreneurs because they can thus take responsibility for
their own future by establishing businesses. However, only a few can make a
living out of working as a knowledge entrepreneur. Therefore, they alternate
between their own businesses and temporary contract jobs in large companies
(Ikonen, 2015: 83). For some, the solution is to move to the big cities because
the opportunities for temporary contracts are better there (Ikonen, 2015: 84–85).
Domestic migration, however, is not an option for everybody (Tolonen, 2005).
This may be partly explained by the fact that, when life is uncertain and insecure,
having a local home-base reinforces one’s identity and security (Bolanski &
Chiapello, 2017).
The knowledge entrepreneur has to deal with areas of responsibility that
were formerly the responsibility of the employer, such as working hours,
taxes, social security costs, responsibility for job security and so on. The
point being made here is that knowledge entrepreneurs do not necessarily have
the freedom normally associated with entrepreneurs. This is where the term
‘entreployee’ (Pongratz & Voss, 2003) may be justified. The knowledge
entrepreneur is both an entrepreneur and an employee (Pongratz & Voss,
2003: 6–8).
The vagabond workers
The vagabond workers are relatively well educated, but they often have a
disability or are migrants. They take on low-paid jobs, but are nevertheless
satisfied because the alternative is so much worse (Banki, 2015: 66).
The vagabond workers distinguish themselves from the working poor with
their higher level of education. However, there are also many migrants among
the working poor with a low level of education.
The work situation of the vagabond workers is characterized by a very high
level of uncertainty. They are often in a waiting position. They are waiting for
new contracts, waiting to ‘advance’ to becoming knowledge entrepreneurs and
waiting for their children to join the salaried elite. However, the opportunities for
upward social mobility are very low for this group (Standing, 2014b: 166).
After World War II, wages and wage increases constituted the strongest “contract”
between employers and employees. This led to stable conditions and a working class
that accepted flexibility of employment conditions and global competition, because
expectations of better pay could always counterbalance the disadvantages of work
flexibilization (Rothkopf, 2009, 2012). Most political parties in Europe and the USA
have accepted and worked for this social employee contract, thus reinforcing this
development, which has also been supported by the middle class.
All members of today’s precariat are motivated by the dream of joining the
salaried élite (Coates & Morrison, 2016: 23–59). The salaried élite are made up
of people with secure, highly paid, permanent jobs. They continue to believe in
the social contract between employer and employee. However, our point is
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simply that the salaried élite will also be crushed and decimated by the mill-
stones of globalization (Standing, 2014b: 14–28).
The vagabond workers are low paid and often hired on contracts that favour
the employer to the disadvantage of the worker. These contracts, which Standing
(2014b: 165) calls ‘zero-hour contracts’, provide extremely high flexibility of the
work situation for employers. In addition, the vagabond workers are often
excluded from the social benefits that the salaried elite, the knowledge entrepre-
neurs and the underemployed have established.
Sub-conclusion
The sub-research question we have examined in this section is: How does the
precariat constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
After World War II and up to today we have witnessed a development that may
be described thus: from jobs without education, to education without jobs. Pre-
viously, education provided a gateway to the middle class, whereas the situation
today suggests something different. This situation may be summarized in the
following statement: ‘Globalisation is making the middle class of the “old”
industrialised nations poor, whereas in the world’s emerging industrialised nations,
we are witnessing the opposite trend – the middle class is growing strongly.’
Among the challenges facing those with higher education today, robotization
has taken over many traditional work operations. This development is increasing
in strength, and is affecting most middle-class jobs. This has had a negative
effect on the number of middle-class jobs available, and is contributing to an
erosion of the middle class.
Not only is the precariat experiencing uncertainty about their employment
situation, but there is also much to suggest they are also experiencing existential
uncertainty. This may be related to the following type of question: ‘What is the
point of a higher education when we meet insurmountable difficulties in getting a
job that matches our education?’ Thus, the precariat is characterized by both
economic and social deterioration.
The precariat is also subjected to a special form of blackmail: either they accept an
insecure and poorly paid job, or they end up unemployed without any particular
form of economic security network. This development leads to, on the one hand,
subordination and obedience (which is perceived as a weakening of their autonomy),
and, on the other, to a feeling of frustration and anger concerning one’s life situation.
The wages levels of the precariat are constantly under pressure. New migrants and
other unemployed workers compete for the same jobs and push wages down further.
In addition, the precariat is put under pressure by workers in low-cost countries.
Among other things, the growth of the precariat may be seen as a result of the
increasing flexibilization of the labour market and the new global division of
labour. In this context, the flexibilization of the labour market means that it is
easier for an employer to terminate an employee.
There is a vague line between temporary employment contracts and temporary
entrepreneurial income. This vague line also means that most people do not
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manage to come to grips with the new uncertainty that is developing in the
workplace. One explanation for this lack of understanding of the workplace’s
uncertainty may be linked to the identity of the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur
perceives him- or herself largely as the author of his or her own success, and thus




The working poor can be found in every country in the world today. They work in
factories, on farms and in the service industry, such as the hotel industry and other
sectors. These workers are largely ‘invisible’. They can be illegal immigrants or
unskilled workers who have lost their jobs and do part-time jobs for several employers.
The working poor are invisible in the sense that they are rarely included in official
statistics. They balance on the edge of poverty, but manage to keep their heads above
water, often because they have several jobs. There are many who need these part-time
jobs, which often only amount to two or three hours per day. These mini-jobs are in
demand and therefore competition forces wages down further. The working poor also
compete with imported goods and services from low-cost countries in Asia and Africa,
which pushes wages further down. The working poor thus struggle against the feeling
of hopelessness, and are forced to take bad jobs at bad wages. In terms of economic
survival, they are constantly moving towards the bottom and almost falling into
poverty. The working poor also constitute the future labour reserve, and they are
willing to do any job for low wages so as not to sink deeper into the swamp of poverty.
Shipler (2005) describes these people’s lives in the USA. However, they may also be
found to the same extent in Europe (Grain et al., 2016).
These workers sometimes work in full-time jobs for poor pay. In addition, they
may have one or more part-time jobs just to scrape by (Allen, 2004: 216). They
are ‘forced to work any job no matter how dirty, embarrassing or dangerous, in
fear of losing the benefits’ (Ainley, 2014: 3).14
The working poor are mainly migrants with poor education, but many of them
are nationals. For example, in India 90 per cent of all workers are hired on
informal contracts in poorly paid jobs.15
The working poor also struggle with the fact that many of them do not have
citizenship in the country where they work, only a residential permit. This excludes
them from many of the democratic processes, and their rights are often severely
limited. They are also faced with the prospect of having to leave the country in
which they live and work. Consequently, they often try to become ‘invisible’ by
ducking under the radar of the public authorities.
As a result of their low income, these migrant workers end up living in ghetto-like
areas where rents are very low. Banki (2015: 68–69) also refers to instances of these
workers in Thailand, where poorly paid Burmese migrants may be found in certain
geographical areas. Altogether, there are about two million Burmese migrants living
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in Thailand (Banki, 2015: 72). Arnold (2005: 319–340) also shows how these
Burmese workers live under very poor conditions. He makes the point that the
workers keep the costs down for the global companies operating in these areas.
In other countries, such as Russia, many factory workers are so poorly paid
that they are unable to cope with the wages they receive (Morris, 2012). In the
post-Soviet period, worker solidarity has been greatly weakened, contributing to
the deterioration of wage levels (Morris, 2012).
The working poor can be found doing the lowest-paid jobs in the service industry,
such as cleaning jobs in hotels. We also find the working poor doing jobs in the
restaurant industry at the bottom of the pay scale. With the rapid growth of robot
technology, it is most probable that many of these jobs will also become redundant, and
that pay will be further reduced for those remaining (Ross, 2016: 39–40).
We have developed a framework to illustrate the working poor (Figure 1.3).
The framework also shows how we have organized this sub-chapter.
Analysis and discussion
In this section, we discuss the elements in the above framework.
Drivers towards the bottom
The emergence of the working poor in Europe may in part be traced back to the
Hartz reforms in Germany. The Hartz reforms were a set of recommendations on
the reform of the German labour market submitted in 2002 by a committee led
by Peter Hartz (hence the name of the reforms). The recommended changes were
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Figure 1.3 A framework for the description of the ‘the working poor’.
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gradually phased in up until 2010 as part of German labour market policy. The
committee proposed ten innovation modules to streamline and increase the
flexibility of working life. The various innovation modules were introduced as
Hartz I to Hartz IV. In particular, Hartz II led to so-called mini-jobs16 becoming a
part of German working life. The Hartz reforms also resulted in many new job
centres being established around the country. The aim of these was to get more
workers to take the so-called mini-jobs.
Hartz IV was implemented in 2005. This largely concerned the coordination
of social welfare benefits. This resulted in a lower level of social welfare
support overall, on average about 391 euros per month in 2013. In addition,
unemployed workers were obliged to take any job offered to them, including
the mini-jobs.17 If the unemployed person did not accept the mini-job offered,
they lost their 391 euros in welfare support. However, before an unemployed
worker could receive any social welfare benefits, they had to document that
they had used up all their savings first. When the unemployed worker takes up
a mini-job, his or her social welfare benefit is withdrawn.18 This led to
minimum wages in Germany spiralling downwards. Consequently, wages in
general were pushed down and there were more people having to do several
jobs in order to support themselves and their families. These developments
help partly explain the emergence of the working poor in Germany. Although
unemployment has fallen sharply in Germany after the introduction of the
Hartz reforms, there has also been a very high increase in the number of the
working poor during the same period.19
It is a common assumption that we identify with our work. Furthermore, the
assumption is that we create our identity through our work (Reich, 2015: 133).
However, this assumption is challenged in the case of the working poor and parts
of the precariat, especially the underemployed and the underpaid. Work does not
contribute to the identity of the aforementioned groups. It is the dream of a better
future that creates their identity. When both parents have several mini-jobs, and
yet barely manage to keep the family away from poverty, they do not see work as
a place where they can realize themselves. They work only to keep the wolf from
the door. In deep contrast, there is an ever-increasing number of rich people: the
very rich (Dorling, 2015). Some of these very rich do not work, but live off their
wealth. Others work, but have an incredibly high income compared with the
working poor (McGill, 2016).
In the past, poverty has usually been linked to unemployed and sick people. In
many countries, these groups get food and shelter from charities. Nowadays,
there is an increasing tendency for the poor to include even those who work hard
because they are unable to support themselves on the small income they receive.
These poor people are not lazy. They are not work-shy. They often have more
than one job, but still remain poor (Grain et al., 2016).
There are many reasons for this trend. One is that global neoliberal ideology
exploits competition between workers, forcing wages down. Political apathy is a
second reason. The low numbers of trade union membership is a third reason.
Robotization of working life is a fourth reason. Lack of education is a fifth reason.
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In 2013, there were 47 million poor people in the USA. This means that every
seventh American (about 14 per cent) lives in poverty (Reich, 2015: 134). Reich
writes that, between 2010 and 2013, wages for the 20 per cent lowest paid in the
USA fell by 8 per cent. Of those who worked more than a normal work-day, yet
were under the government-defined poverty line, half received food handouts
from various charities (Reich, 2015: 134).
How could so many workers over such a short period of time suddenly be
worth so little in terms of wages? The answer is that globalization increased
competition – pushing down wages. Companies wished to reduce costs, so they
outsourced to low-cost countries. Company operations were moved in part or in
their entirety to low-cost countries. For instance, American companies were
moved to Mexico, German companies were moved to Poland and Romania, and
labour-intensive companies in the west were moved to China and India. The
most recent developments show a relocation of jobs from China to Bangladesh
and Myanmar. The result of the above examples is that competition forces down
wage levels. This has also led to unemployment, uncertainty and an increase in
the number of working poor.
In addition to the above developments, automation, digitization, artificial
intelligence and robotization have affected the entire labour market. One of the
consequences is that many middle-class work operations have been taken over by
robots with artificial intelligence, thus pushing middle-class workers into lower-
paid service jobs (Reich, 2015: 134). Thus, several factors are forcing down
wages, resulting in the wages of the working poor coming under pressure.
The number of low-paid workers belonging to a trade union in the USA is
very low. This applies to hotel workers, restaurant workers, workers in retail
sales and fast-food chains, and so on (Reich, 2015: 134–135). In the Nordic
countries, minimum wages and the number of workers belonging to a trade union
are higher than in the USA, and in a number of countries in southern Europe
such as Spain, Greece and Italy (Gratton, 2011: 105–133). This means that we
have not yet seen a large growth of the working poor in the Nordic region.
On the edge of the precipice
It’s not a question of the working poor lacking ambition, commitment, dreams or
the desire to work. It is rather that they are paid too little for the work they
actually do, so they are unable to support themselves and their families. In the
first decades after World War II (1945–1990), a poor person in the USA had
approximately a 50 per cent chance of climbing up the social ladder to the
middle class. Today, in stark contrast, it is highly probable that a poor person will
remain poor (Reich, 2015: 139).
The new poor, the working poor, are also recruited from the many who
dropped out of secondary school, i.e. they are unskilled. In the past, they could
find jobs in industry, agriculture, the service sector, transport, the roadworks
industry, the construction industry, on ships, and so on. Today, these avenues of
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employment are largely closed to these people because such jobs require voca-
tional training. In addition, many of the jobs are now automated and taken over
by various types of robots. The unskilled workers can now find jobs in the retail
industry, fast food chains, and other places where wages and the level of trade
union membership are low. But even in these sectors, robotization and artificial
intelligence have taken over a number of work operations previously performed
by unskilled workers.
There is a low awareness among the working poor concerning the benefit of
joining a trade union to ensure higher pay (Shipler, 2005), partly because they
come from poorly educated families (Grain et al., 2016). The young working poor
even risk competing with their parents and grandparents for the same jobs. Even
though their parents had a poor education, they could at least find jobs in industry,
such as the car industry in Detroit. The assembly line technology, which was the
distinctive feature of Fordism and industrialization, has now spread throughout the
world. The ‘global assembly line’ today is located in various regions according to a
logic of costs, quality, competence and innovation. The factory jobs in Detroit’s
automotive industry disappeared to the low-cost countries. Working in the retail
trade for poor pay was an option for those who could no longer find a job in the
automotive industry. However, former factory workers might find themselves
competing with their own sons or daughters for the same poor pay (Ainley, 2016).
In the UK, Germany, France, Belgium, Spain, Greece, Italy and other western
European countries, the same trend, as described above in the USA, is taking
place, i.e. the emergence of the new poor underclass, the working poor (Gratton,
2011: 105–133). When steel production moved from European countries such as
Germany, France and Belgium to China and other low-cost countries, many
former industrial workers were made redundant. Other jobs at the same wage
level were hard to find. After a period of time, when welfare support was lost,
these unskilled workers joined the ranks of the working poor. Simultaneous with
this trend, youth unemployment has increased in most EU countries (Armano &
Murgia, 2015: 102–117). Many young people seeking work have tried their luck
in other EU countries and, although some have been successful, most have joined
the working poor (Banki, 2015: 66–79).
Today, a large part of the younger generation are having to struggle with
economic exclusion. Their fathers and mothers lost their jobs in the factories and
failed to find similar jobs. Their grandparents have moved back ‘home’, because
pension funds were decimated during the last major economic crisis which
started in the autumn of 2007 (Reich, 2015: 139–141). Fear of the future, fear
of the unknown and the shame of failing to meet the challenges posed by the
global economy characterize parts of the working poor (Gratton, 2011: 110).
At the same time as this psychological description becomes a reality, another
psychological factor is on the rise. It is becoming ever more important to stand
out from the crowd. Narcissistic self-presentation is becoming part of contem-
porary youth culture. The reason for this is straightforward. Young people
believe this gives them the best opportunity to stand out from the crowd and
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be in a position to secure a better future (Gratton, 2011: 111). How have so
many ended up on the edge of the precipice – staring down into the abyss of
poverty?
The neoliberal global capitalism that started in the late 1970s must take a
significant part of the blame for the fact that many young people today believe
they may suffer poverty in the future (Atkinson, 2010). Poverty is spreading like
an epidemic, not only in poor countries, but in the heart of the rich industrial
nations. This trend has led to the claim that neoliberal globalization ideology is
making the middle class poor. One could paraphrase this and say that globalization
makes rich nations poorer and poor nations richer. Bubbles and economic crises
are eroding the savings of millions of people. It’s not only those who dropped out
of school who end up joining the working poor, but also the unskilled industrial
workers, the skilled industrial workers and craftsmen, because robotization forces
even more workers into unemployment. At the same time, the middle class are
being pushed into poverty because artificial intelligence is taking over many of the
typical middle-class work functions. The retirees who lost their savings due to
economic crises have also joined the army of the poor.
Young people at the bottom
At the bottom of the labour market we find the young people who dropped out of
school. These young people never completed a trade education, such as carpen-
try, electrical engineering, plumbing, and so on. They wash cars, do part-time
jobs in shops when there is demand, sell burgers in MacDonald’s and other fast
food chains. They help you find what you want in the big store chains and wash
your windows. They often live at home, even though their peers have long since
established a family (Shipler, 2005).
Some of them may manage to climb out of this economic hole; however, few
will achieve this. It is those with talent and strong motivation to lift themselves
out of poverty who will move up the social ladder. But, most of these young
people will remain in poverty the rest of their lives.
It is not the alcoholic, the drug addict or the lazy person we are talking about
here. The young people who have joined the working poor do the best they can.
Their parents did the best they could too. Both groups are held down in poverty
by a system that is served by having workers who are willing to work for a
pittance. They do not try to change the structures that hold them where they are
(Gratton, 2011). These are the apathetic young who are tired of political promises
and empty promises. They don’t trust politicians who are interested only in
improving their own lot, and that of their children.
The fall
Young people who have become the working poor, their parents and their
grandparents are not only poor, but also socially excluded from participating in
the wealth they see around them (Chomsky, 2016a, 2016b). The sense of social
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exclusion is the sense of having been ‘left behind’, of having been left out in the
forest to die. The Ancient Greeks used social exclusion to punish their political
opponents. Such a punishment is so extreme that death may seem a better
alternative, as shown by the example of Socrates. Socrates chose to drink a
glass of poison rather than be banished. The absence of contact with others, with
the society one is part of, is the punishment borne by the poor. Punishment for
what? They are being punished for not living up to society’s expectations
regarding ‘education, education, education’ (Wakeling & Savage, 2015). Those
who do succeed in becoming educated will, however, still find it difficult in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution to secure jobs that correspond to their level of
education (Wakeling & Savage, 2015). The few people who manage to educate
themselves out of the working poor will end up in the precariat (Standing,
2014a).
The working poor live in their own residential areas. They shop in their own
low-price stores. However, they are very aware of this separation from the rest of
society (Monbiot, 2016: 9). Social exclusion is a form of loneliness that affects
all age groups, but possibly it is greatest among the young working poor.
Monbiot (2016: 10) writes: ‘Ebola is unlikely ever to kill as many people as the
disease of loneliness.’ It is the social isolation and exclusion from the commu-
nity, ‘the disease of loneliness’, that affects many around the world. We cannot
manage on our own. That is why poor young people and other poor people seek
to form a community together. However, this also reinforces the feeling of being
excluded from the wealth of the gluttonous society. In addition, this community
at the bottom of society reinforces social imbalances and reproduces poverty. The
speed of the social collapse we see in the case of the precariat and the working
poor can be compared with the rapidity of the spread of innovations. Those on
the lowest rung of the social ladder who can be regarded as part of the working
poor no longer have the dream of educating themselves for a trade or profession
to support themselves in the future. Their dream is essentially linked to becoming
rich and famous (Monbiot, 2016: 10). But, this will remain only a dream. Their
lives are visible to others only when they take part in movements that will
change the structures that hold them down. They will remain invisible until they
begin to claim more of society’s economic surplus.
Invisible work
Much of the cotton that clothes are made from is picked by underpaid workers
in poor countries. The health of these farm workers is also often affected by
the poison that is sprayed on the fields to ensure maximum profits from the
cotton plantations (Chomsky, 2012, 2016a, 2016b). After the cotton is classified
and packed it is sent to countries such as Bangladesh, where new invisible
underpaid workers produce clothes from the raw cotton. Thus, people don’t
‘see’ these workers when they buy suits or dresses in western stores. The
clothes are labelled, given a brand name – and it is the quality and price that
are in focus. The price is the most essential factor. The price is kept low
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because the wages of the workers who make the clothes are extremely low.
These workers in the global economy are the invisible poor workers (Hochs-
child, 2016: xi). The global production chain makes the poverty invisible for
those who contribute to pushing prices further down when they buy products
such as shoes or dresses.
In the industrialized world that largely buys these cheap clothes, many workers
who previously worked in the domestic textile factories have been made
redundant. The models who display the clothes such as dresses, suits, shoes,
however, match the ideas the buyers have about the aesthetic (Stewart, 2016:
130–148). This presentation and advertising of the clothes make the workers
behind these clothes even more invisible. A similar global production chain
exists for most industries, including the food industry (Otis & Zhao, 2016:
148–169).
It is not only in the cotton and clothing industry that we find the invisible poor
workers. Many businesses have seen the benefits of sending some of their
operations to low-cost countries, for example to Bangalore in India. This may
be part of their financial, informational, information technology (IT), sales or
human resources (HR) operations. In those countries where operations are
exported to low-cost countries, the pressure to reduce wages is also increased.
The reason is straightforward. Global competition pushes down wages through-
out the whole of the global production chain. This problem is very widespread.
More than 50 per cent of all the Fortune 500 companies have outsourced much
of the work to low-cost countries that they previously performed domestically
(Poster, 2016: 87–113). The invisible workers are one of the factors that impact
the future workplaces in the industrialized countries.
What is not shown when the poor workers in the global value chain are made
invisible? What is hidden is, among other things, the structural constraints. Coercion
and oppression need not be linked to personal relationships. Coercion and oppres-
sion, and in part violence, can be found in the structures created by the global value
chain. However, one cannot mobilize anger and aggression against structures.
Therefore, we often see frustration taking irrational directions, and leading to
arbitrary violence and other social manifestations that seem completely irrational.
The prices of the goods we buy in the west often do not reflect the work effort
that produced them. Prices reflect only how far down wages can be pushed to
increase profits. Yet 50 years ago we could see the whole value chain in our local
towns and villages in the factories and on the farms. During this period, trade
unions were more effective in negotiating pay conditions whereas today this has
become very difficult globally. Today, we are buyers of goods produced by poor
workers in countries such as Bangladesh. We have become more concerned about
the price of the goods than the conditions the workers who produce the goods work
under. In the past, we could talk to the boss at the factory and respond through a
trade union. Today, the workers in Bangladesh are unable to talk to, for instance,
the boss in Wal-Mart or other chains. They notice only that their wages are reduced
or when they lose their jobs because production has moved somewhere else, such
as Mozambique, Zaire, Angola, Myanmar, or other low-cost countries. The global
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value chain makes what was once visible to everyone in the factories into invisible
work in, for example countries like Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The dream
All the young people that Shipler (2005: 231–235) talked to had a desire to
continue their studies by going to college, because they knew it was the only way
to get out of poverty. Many of their parents were unemployed, so they knew
what poverty was in practice.
Most of their parents did not have a trade. Sixty per cent of the children
Shipler interviewed wanted to be lawyers so they could help people. The
ambitions and dreams of these teenagers (aged 12–14 years) were clearly
evident. When asked where they thought they would be in 10 years, almost
all of them answered that they saw themselves as doctors, lawyers, dentists,
archaeologists, and so on. The vision of the future was bright and positive for
them. However, the reality 10 years after they were first asked about their
dreams was something quite different. Ten years later, most of them are now
are poor young people without educational qualifications or work (Shipler,
2005: 233–242). Everything is possible until one’s dreams are crushed in the
meeting with reality.
The politicians have expressed a vision that all young people should get an
education so that they can cope with the emerging economy. The new economy,
no matter what we call it, will be characterized by the use of robots, informatiza-
tion, digitization and computerization of work. In addition, value creation will be
spread over the globe.
If nations are to succeed in such a situation, they must develop a focused
strategy. China developed such a focused strategy in the late 1980s20 for foreign
investment in China. Bangalore in India has also developed such a strategy. They
aimed to become world leaders in the software industry. However, in the process
of transformation that we are now in, it would not be the right strategy to depend
on the market for domestic development. We have seen the consequences of such
a neoliberalist strategy in Wales and in West Virginia (the Rust Belt in the USA).
The results are disappointing. Unemployment is high, pay levels poor and the
level of education also poor (Ross, 2016: 42–43).
Sub-conclusion
The question we have investigated in this section is: ‘How do the working poor
constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ The short answer is:
those who drop out of school in the west enter the ranks of the working poor.
These people will be socialized into poverty. Through their defeats and failures at
school, they have learned to become losers, the future working poor.
The working poor perform work that is essential for others so they can enjoy
their lives and live in abundance. Social mobility is threatened by these new
structures. The working poor are structurally locked into a poor existence,
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without much opportunity to climb up the social ladder from their first job and
upwards in the wages hierarchy.
Unemployment statistics are no longer as relevant as they were in the past.
Unemployment may be low, but the working poor can barely live off their wages.
The trends of more part-time jobs, mini-jobs and the flexibility of working life
have created a new underclass below the precariat. They have jobs and are thus
not included in unemployment statistics, but find it hard to get by despite having
more than one job.
The more detailed answer to the question we have examined in the section is
linked to the shifting of economic and social tectonic plates. The factors that will
change the workplace of the future are automation, informatization, digitization,
robots and informats. This shifting of economic tectonic plates will destroy the
old economic and social continent, and create a new continent with completely
new social structures.
This development creates new jobs in the industrialized world, even though
the entrance fee in terms of expertise is high. Behind these new jobs, however, is
a global value chain where invisible workers make this possible. The new
continent consists of robots that perform work functions that were previously
carried out by many workers. Productivity increases with the new technology.
This applies not only to industry. For instance, in hospitals, robots are being
developed for diagnosis, medication and operations, and to function as nursing
assistants and nurses. Some businesses have developed receptionists in the form
of holograms connected to a digital system. This development, however,
demands more engineers in the software industry, which places the jobs of
nurses and nursing assistants in the risk zone.
In the service industry, which employs millions of people in the west, we find
hotel receptionists, restaurant workers, childcare workers, home helpers, cleaning
workers, and so on. These workers are meeting strong competition for their jobs
on many fronts, such as from immigrants and unemployed people. Consequently,
wages are squeezed and working conditions worsened. This constitutes part of
the structures that are creating the working poor.
The globalization of the workforce has led to global competition forcing down
wages. When wages are forced down, profits increase for the few. This means
that the numbers of the poor will increase, whereas the few become richer and
richer. We will experience the economy being divided into four parts: first, the
super-rich, also referred to as the 1 per cent class; second, the salaried élite
consisting of the knowledge workers and innovation workers; third, the precariat,
who will probably constitute the largest part of the workforce; and, finally, we
have the working poor. There is much to suggest that those receiving welfare
support will be forced into mini-jobs, as a consequence of measures such as the
German Hartz reforms mentioned above. In this way, the working poor will
increase in number.
The cocktail of lower pay, higher unemployment, rising profits and more
innovations will most likely lead to continual stock market bubbles and eco-
nomic crises, both large and small. These crises will spread extremely quickly
20 The workplace of the future
due to new technology. This will be particularly true of the new robotic systems
that will control financial transactions. The rate at which these crises will spread
will lead to instability and insecurity for everyone, but it is the working poor who
will suffer poverty, whereas the wealthy will merely suffer limited adversity.
It is not new technology that causes millions of workers to lose their jobs and
end up in the ranks of the working poor. It is solely an intentional political act
that is the cause of this development. Robotization could, if desired, have
resulted in increased productivity and value creation being shared by more
people. In this way, poverty could have been abolished and working hours
reduced. Many people could have had a better life with robots, informats,
digitization and informatization. What is happening now is that we are creating
a global underclass: the working poor. It is possible that a cocktail of frustrated
groups within the precariat and the working poor will contain sufficient explosive
force to change political structures in most societies.
The innovation worker and the knowledge worker
Description
Peter Drucker (1999a, 1999b) describes knowledge workers as those who use their
intellectual abilities to perform their work. Florida (2002) takes this a step further
and describes knowledge workers as the creative and innovative class. Lessard and
Baldwin (2000) take a different perspective and call knowledge workers ‘net
slaves’ who are victims of the new technology. Sennett (2006) regards knowledge
workers as ‘the new spirit of capitalism’. Knowledge workers are thus difficult to
define, and they constitute a multi-faceted group. What is common to this group is
that they develop, transfer and work with symbols. In essence, knowledge workers
are either employees in organizations or else they perform work activities for
organizations in other ways, such as consultancy work or contract work. In some
cases, there may be an unclear boundary between knowledge workers and knowl-
edge entrepreneurs. What distinguishes the two groups is that knowledge workers
generally have permanent well-paid jobs, whereas knowledge entrepreneurs are
often hired on temporary, insecure contracts.
Innovation workers and knowledge workers belong to the salaried élite, the
well-paid section of salaried employees. Both innovation workers and knowledge
workers adhere to the idea that only a postgraduate education, such as a Master’s
or PhD, can ensure a good job in the future, i.e. they believe such an education is
necessary in order to be successful.
One of the results of globalization is that companies have realized that
creativity, expertise and innovation are the new competitive parameters (Case,
2016). Profit relies heavily on businesses being able to bring creativity and
innovation to the market (Bleuer et al., 2017; Xie, 2017; Zhao et al., 2017).
This is where innovation workers emerge as being the solution to a problem. The
problem is that businesses are unable to compete on costs, so therefore they must
compete on innovation.
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Education in the global economy has become a commodity in line with other
commodities. Thus, in the future, the quality, brand and reputation of educational
institutions will be given greater emphasis. This will result in an increased
emphasis on the ranking of educational institutions – that is to say, students
from the best universities will be given more opportunities in their working lives
(Savage, 2015: 221–257). Universities are popping up like mushrooms around
the world. In China alone there were approximately 300 universities with 20
million students in 2008, and in that year, 6 million students graduated.21 This
only reinforces the tendency towards gradation of educational institutions around
the world. The consequences for graduates are obvious. The graduates from the
less prestigious universities will have fewer opportunities in the job market,
whereas graduates from the top universities will have the best opportunities.
Savage (2015: 221) clearly states: ‘universities are affecting future careers’.
The time is past when higher education itself opened all the doors for
future career opportunities (Savage, 2015: 290–296). First, the length and
depth of an education are important. A Master’s or PhD is becoming a
necessary condition to be being an innovation and knowledge worker. How-
ever, this alone is not sufficient. A decisive factor is the reputation, and hence
the quality, of the university where one earns one’s degree. The élite
universities open doors for those who want to be innovation workers and
knowledge workers with future dream jobs. These will eventually join the
salaried élite, helping to maintain the reproduction of social inequality
(Savage, 2015: 222; Wakeling & Savage, 2015a). The mediocre and poor
universities provide opportunities for those who will be knowledge entrepre-
neurs and will thus belong to the precariat.
We have visualized the innovation worker and the knowledge worker in their
future roles in Figure 1.4.
Analysis and discussion
In this section we discuss the five elements in the above framework.
Pyjama-workers
Innovation workers who have relatively autonomous working lives are as likely to
work in their pyjamas, and from their beds, as in the office (Tapia, 2009). This
suggests that flexible working will become more in demand than work–life
balance. Innovation workers will be able to manage their own working and leisure
time. For an innovation worker, being at work is not the same as being at the office.
Being at work means being engaged in a task, and then it is less important whether
one is lolling in bed or wandering around the garden in one’s pyjamas. It is all
about the product – not about clocking in at the office. The industrial logic in the
minds of many managers hinders innovation processes, however, because these
managers want to control and manage their workforce. It is very likely, however,
that this kind of management style will soon be past its sell-by date.
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What characterizes the innovation worker is that he or she is extremely
connected in social networks. These workers largely belong to the millennium
generation, those born between 1977 and 1997. We find them to a large extent
in major global businesses such as Deloitte, Cisco, Bell Canada, Jetblue,
Google, Apple, NASA, Facebook, Proctor & Gamble, Nike, Lockheed Martin,
and so on (Meister & Willyerd, 2010). These people are extremely committed
to what they are working on. Their social life is largely their work, and they
are what may be termed ‘über-connected’ (Meister & Willyerd, 2010: 122–
124). The businesses where innovation workers work largely use social media
to develop their reputation (consumer brand) (Meister & Willyerd, 2010: 123).
In the future, it is the reputation of the business that will be a key factor in its
success. Therefore, it is crucial how the business is perceived by the outside
world. The same goes for the innovation worker. His or her reputation is his or
her trademark.
In the global knowledge economy, the office of the innovation worker and the
knowledge worker will be wherever they happen to have access to their digital
technology. This technology may be embodied in a smart phone, laptop, robot
computer, ‘holographic machine’, nano-technology, etc. (Avent, 2016). He or she
can thus work lying in bed in pyjamas, or at a café bar.
As a rule, the innovation worker will want to work at ‘third places’, not at the
location of the actual business, nor at home, but at a third place, such as a
holiday cabin, a coffee shop, a hotel, on the train, at the airport, on the beach or
on a hiking trip in the Alps, and the like. The pyjama workers work where they
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Figure 1.4 A framework for future innovation workers and knowledge workers.
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It is important to note that, although innovation and knowledge workers are creative
and skilled, their success is often linked to the team they work with (Grant, 2014). In
the global knowledge economy, this team is spread out across the globe. Consequently,
innovation and knowledge workers often work in global competence clusters.
This insight will most probably lead to hiring and problem-solving pro-
cesses for innovation workers and knowledge workers, veering away from the
employment of individuals and towards hiring entire teams. It may also be
imagined that teams are used in the innovation process, without actually
employing the team. This process may be called ‘crowdsourcing’, a term
introduced by Howe (2006). Specifically, this means that businesses, such as
Lego, Procter & Gamble and Boeing use ‘the wisdom of crowds’ (Suro-
wiecki, 2005) to solve problems. Grant (2014) also found this to be a success
factor in his research. The teams may be located in the global space in global
competence clusters. Global competence clusters are not geographically
located in one place, but are spread over the global social network. They
come together when there is a problem that they have special talents to solve.
Global competence clusters may be imagined as being activated in response
to a specific problem. The problem is then solved by the global competence
cluster working in unison. Once the problem has been solved, the specific
global competence cluster is dissolved.
A controversial proposal, but certainly a realistic one, is that innovation and
knowledge workers will have a preference for electing their own leaders. There
are already businesses where the head manager is appointed by the board,
whereas the middle managers are elected from and by the employees. Meister
and Willyerd (2010: 224) refer to W.L. Goore & Associates, where the head
manager allows employees to elect their own middle managers. An important
criterion for being elected is for you to have shown that you are a team builder
and that you can make the team work effectively. In the example mentioned
above, several selection criteria were used and analysed to select the leader. One
of the benefits of this approach is reported to be a very low turnover of staff in
the business (Meister & Willyerd, 2010: 222–226).
Robot and informat technology
Our assumption is that jobs and careers in the future will be under pressure due
to many factors. The two most important factors are probably global competition
and new technology.
Global competition will most probably lead to the greater part of jobs being
affected. In this context, average wages will be reduced, although productivity
will increase radically (Avent, 2016).
Productivity will be greatly increased due to new technology (Abd, 2017;
Wilson, 2017). The new technology, consisting of robots, artificial intelligence,
informats, nano-computers, analysis and diagnostic machines will take over parts
of, and in some cases entire functions and processes of, jobs previously carried
out by people (Wilson, 2017; Zhao et al., 2017). This is not a case of 10, 20 or
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30 per cent of the jobs, but as high as 50–80 per cent of jobs being taken over by
the new technology, such as robots and informats.22
The extent of robotization will vary from country to country. Countries that
produce robots and sell them on the international market will be able to increase
employment. In this context, Ross (2016: 40–41) mentions countries such as
South Korea, Japan and Germany. Low-cost countries, such as China and other
countries, will be the most vulnerable to this development. However, these
countries will also be able to adjust to robotization, but will have to make great
efforts to retrain workers, and reform their educational systems to a large extent.
If unskilled workers are going to have any hope of getting a job, they will have
to retrain to do jobs such as robot operators, robot technicians, robot engineers,
robot designers, and so on.
Developments in low-cost countries may be compared with what happened to
industrial jobs in the industrialized countries at the end of the twentieth century.
One may imagine, for example, that the Chinese leadership could take a dual
approach. They continue with their low-cost industry, while focusing on skills
development in robot technology (Ross, 2016: 40–41). This may be achieved
because the influx of people into urban areas is very high in China and supported
by government policies. Urban growth in China has greatly increased in recent
decades: in 1950, 13 per cent lived in urban areas, but by 2015 this had risen to
50 per cent. Chinese government policy is to increase this to 70 per cent by
2025.23 This development will enable competence building, while retaining low
costs on labour-intensive industry jobs.
Thus, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is not only making itself visible in the
industrialized countries but also in those countries that are in the process of
industrialization. If labour wages increase in China, one can imagine that China
will subcontract and outsource work to countries such as Bangladesh, Zaire,
Angola, Mozambique and other countries in Africa. The beginnings of such a
strategy have already started (Gaskarth, 2015; Swider, 2015; Otis et al., 2016).
Interesting in this context is the fact that the industrial wage in some Chinese
companies (March 2016) is on a par with the industrial wage in southern
European countries.24
When labour costs increase, while robot technology is becoming cheaper
because of mass production, more and more of industrial production and service
production will be robotized. This will also force low-cost areas to transform to
robot technology, which will open up the opportunity for countries such as China
and Germany to educate the workforce, so it can adapt to the great transforma-
tion of work and economy.
Robots don’t demand pay rises; on the contrary, they get cheaper and cheaper,
because they are mass produced. Robots don’t go on strike, so they are easy to
manage. Robots don’t criticize, so they are easy to lead. Robots don’t have cultural
hang-ups, so they don’t generate social and emotional tensions. These are some of
the factors behind the great transformation, the transformation of the workforce
over a relatively short period through robot technology. This will apply to both
industrialized countries and those that are in the process of industrialization.
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They are part of a global competence cluster
The security, predictability and safety of permanent jobs in the industrial society
will most likely disappear either completely or in part in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (Standing, 2014a; Varga, 2015; Wang, 2015). Innovation and knowl-
edge workers will not need to adhere to a nine-to-five workday – a trend that will
eventually spread to the entire workforce (Gratton, 2011: 196). When everything
is changing, how can you succeed when you don’t know what will be required of
you in the future? There are three areas that will determine who succeeds and
who fails. The first is their intellectual capital, which concerns the level of
education. For the innovation and knowledge workers, this will require a
Master’s degree or PhD. However, a high level of education is only one
necessary condition to achieving success. There are two other sufficient condi-
tions that need to be in place if one is to succeed in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution. One factor is social capital, which concerns the social network you
are part of and how tightly knit the relationships are that you have in this
network. The other factor is one’s political capital, i.e. how close the ties are that
you have to the person(s) who makes decisions that may affect your future. It is
the system composed of these three factors that will be crucial to one’s success,
when all known work is transformed into something new and unknown (Kessler,
2017).
The rules of the game change when everything is transformed into something
new and unknown. Consider companies such as Uber, Google, Instagram,
Microsoft, Apple, Cisco, IBM, SunTrust, and so on. These companies behaved
strategically, had an extreme customer focus and were capable of extreme
change. However, the most important thing about these companies was that
they changed the rules of the industry. This is what Christensen terms disruption
(Christensen, 2016).
All the job experience we have gained is collapsing. Our future colleagues do
not necessarily work at our place of work – they can be scattered around the
world in global competence clusters. We do not necessarily have a fixed place of
work to go to, but use locations such as coffee shops and the social areas in
fitness centres to get in touch with our colleagues in the global competence
clusters. Possibly, owners of fitness centres will identify this trend and install
small and large office units and canteens.
A large Gallup survey has shown that only 32 per cent of employees are
committed to their jobs (Meister & Mulcahy, 2017: 228). This implies that in
the future employers should seek those who have talent and also a strong
commitment to an idea. We also know with certainty that robots will
eliminate bureaucracies and hierarchies. Consequently, when designing work-
places, one should think of functions rather than positions. The innovation
worker and the knowledge worker can manage themselves, and do not need
intermediaries to set the agenda for their work processes. On the other hand,
there will still be requirements regarding which results should be delivered
and when.
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Workplaces built in the industrial era, with their bureaucracies and hierarchies,
will be subjected to transformation. If they are not changed, they will be crushed
by the new technology (Arnold, 2005; Bennis et al., 2012). The new organiza-
tions and new jobs will most probably be functionally, not hierarchically,
organized. The new jobs will be organized in relation to people with talent,
with ideas about what makes them feel passionate. Those who are not passionate
about an idea will have no place in organizations of the future. The future
organization of the workplace will crystallize into an emphasis on the organiza-
tion’s meeting with the customer, the user, the patient, the student, and so on.
This design, based on experiences gained from meeting customers and users, will
promote a front-line focus and will downplay the past functions of bureaucracy
and hierarchy in the industrial society.
Cross-functional education
Robotization not only eliminates bureaucracies and hierarchies, but also changes
the professions of knowledge workers. Susskind and Susskind (2015) say this
will apply to doctors, nurses, teachers, accountants, architects, priests, consul-
tants, lawyers, and others.
The nature of their work will be completely different from in the pre-robotized
society. Robots and artificial intelligence will shatter both the form and the
content of the traditional knowledge professions. If such an assumption proves
to be correct, the question is: ‘What will the content of the knowledge workers’
jobs look like when robots take over many of their functions?’ The robots
referred to here are those driven by artificial intelligence and informats that, in
addition to having artificial intelligence, are interconnected globally so they have
access to the latest information and research results.
The positive aspect of this development is that industrial robots have created
more jobs than they have destroyed.25 For instance, this applies to welding
robots, which require many substructures. The construction of these provides
many developmental jobs in the outlying regions of Denmark, says chief
economist Allan Lyngsø Madsen of Danish Metal.26 Madsen’s analysis is as
follows:
If automation results in an increase in productivity of 15 percent, then
employment will fall by 7 percent within the first three years. However, in
the long term, employment will increase because the company will become
more competitive and more orders will eventually be placed.27
However, the weakness of such an analysis is obvious. If everyone were to do
the same as Danish metal, and use more industrial robots, then this will only
increase competition overall. The benefits of increased productivity in such a
situation will not lead to more sales and more employees, but to increased global
competition. This may be likened to standing up from your seat at a football
match so as to see the game better. The first few who do this will see the game
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better, but when everyone does the same then the advantage will be lost. Thus,
Madsen’s analysis is erroneous in the global competitive economy. Exactly the
same reasoning may be used regarding the fact that competition from robots and
artificial intelligence eliminates many of the functions that knowledge and
innovation workers perform today. Therefore, it is crucial that the education
system be reformed to meet these needs before robots make the current education
system redundant.
If policy-makers choose to ignore what is happening to knowledge and
innovation workers, then their policies will have fatal consequences for the
education system, the professions and economic growth (Susskind & Susskind,
2015). It is not hard to understand the new developments that are emerging. The
challenge is to get rid of ideas from the industrial society about how to manage
and organize work. In addition, it will be a challenge to change many of the
educational programmes so that they take into account the ever-increasing use of
robots, informats and artificial intelligence.
Changing these mental models will be the hardest of all the tasks. The point is,
however, that, if we do not change our ideas from the industrial society, the
knowledge society’s robots will change our perception of these ideas. Either we
must plan our future ourselves, or there are other forces that will make us an
obedient tool of their interests. ‘Plan or be planned for,’ said Ackoff (1989). This
applies more than ever today.
Innovation and knowledge workers are experts in their field of study. What
should we do with their expertise if a robot with its artificial intelligence coupled
with all available knowledge in the global space (informats) can do the same, but
with higher quality and safety, and lower costs?
In the near future, users will be able to come into contact with robots that have this
expertise at a lower cost and higher performance. This will not necessarily happen
overnight, but will be more like a cascade of incremental innovations. Each of these
innovations will, like the killer whale, take a small bite from the profession’s previous
field of operation. Slowly but surely, robots and informats with their artificial
intelligence will take over many of the professional tasks that are carried out today,
for instance, the tasks of doctors and nurses in the medical profession. In the future,
hospitals will become workplaces for engineers just as much as they are for doctors.
Doctors and nurses will need a multi-education, i.e. they will possess engineering
skills as well as having knowledge of anatomy and diseases. On the other hand, the
hospital–engineer will also be educated in anatomy and diseases. Slowly but surely,
the lawyer, architect, teacher, economist and HR leader will become assistants of their
former assistants, i.e. the robots. In such a scenario, all of these professions will need
to include robot technology in their education. Future educational programmes may
thus be designed for the medical–engineer, the nurse–technician, the teacher–engineer,
the economist–anthropologist and the HR–innovator, to mention just a few.
The future will not resemble the past for innovation and knowledge workers,
but will be greatly impacted by the use of robots and informats. Thus, new ways
of thinking, new educational programmes, new models and new mental tools will
be needed.
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Knowledge professions, such as the medical, legal and architect professions,
will be greatly affected by the use of robots and informats. The expert has
knowledge and experience. Much of this knowledge can be digitized and used in
artificial intelligence systems. The same goes for some of the expert’s experi-
ence. However, not all types of experience can be digitized. We do not yet have
the means of digitizing the type of experience known as tacit knowledge.
However, in the future this may become possible, using artificial intelligence.
This would create a situation where robots and informats would also be able to
learn from their experiences. This would pose further challenges for many
professions that would have to rethink what is the purpose of their activities.
Companies that had to close down or were bought up for various reasons all
have something in common: they ignored what was happening – new develop-
ments. They were not future oriented, i.e. they did not think from the future and
back to the present. Instead, they thought from the past and then extrapolated the
past into the future, i.e. they used history to look forward. The death rate of
organizations is high in the knowledge economy. Of the Fortune 500 organizations
that have been established since 2000, 51 per cent have closed down (Wang, 2015).
The workplace of knowledge and innovation workers is changing at an
unbelievably fast rate. Changes involve where you work, how you work, whom
you work with and when you work, and are taking on completely different forms
than in the industrial society. Due to robots and informats, future organizations
are learning machines that change in step with changes in the outside world. To
achieve this, both big and small organizations must organize themselves to be
flexible and change quickly. We can say that tomorrow’s organizations must be
able to change so they can create their own future. The leaders who are able to
do this must also encourage their employees to be change agents, and focus on
the use of new technology (Bratianu, 2015; Case, 2016).
Apart from pay, knowledge and innovation workers consider flexibility more
important than anything else when considering a job offer (Meister & Mulcahy,
2017: 12). To achieve this, there has been a reinvention of goals, results and
performance management that has taken another form. The knowledge worker
wishes to have full flexibility in relation to where he or she works, when, how and
with whom. To achieve this, he or she is willing to enter into contracts concerning
what will be delivered over a specific period of time. This may be termed
‘performance management’, where it is the goals and results that are essential, not
where you have your office. This development is already taking place in companies
such as Adobe, IBM, General Electric, Microsoft, Accenture and Cisco, to name just
a few (Meister & Mulcahy, 2017: 52). Furthermore, the knowledge professions are
changing to such an extent that it is becoming more and more common for team
intelligence to be crucial, not the individual’s performance (Gant, 2014).
Global analysis and diagnosis robots
Traditionally, the patient visits the doctor when he or she doesn’t feel well.
However, by this time a threshold may already have been exceeded, so that the
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doctor will need to prescribe medication, with the possibility that this may have
side effects. However, if we imagine that everyone has access to a ‘diagnosis
machine’ – let’s call this an online informat – then this would change the
doctor’s work to a great extent. The diagnosis machine will, at a very early
stage, be able to provide a report of any disease that is developing and give
guidelines on what the individual must and can do to prevent or mitigate the
course of the disease. One can further imagine small, mobile hospitals, which we
will call ‘hospital trailers’, filled with technology that can diagnose, medicate,
and make simple and complicated interventions. In such a future, the giant
hospitals will become a thing of the past. They will become monuments from
the industrial age, when size meant success. Today, an important argument is that
large hospitals are needed because they provide a meeting place for all the skills
that are needed, and that size means it is possible to buy expensive machines. In
the near future, these skills will be found in informats. The informats will have
more skills than all of the doctors put together in a large super-hospital. If the
informats are mass produced, both of the main arguments concerning the need
for large hospitals will not be applicable.
If we envisage this kind of future, our gigantic hospitals will be worthless as
health-promoting institutions. We use the expression 'hospital trailers' to empha-
size that size in the knowledge society is not a recipe for success. The Fourth
Industrial Revolution will develop robotized and specialized small units that take
account of customers’ geographical location rather than the system’s need for
gigantomania.
The development of small robot systems that can carry out medical functions
is already under way. Pacemakers and insulin pumps are two examples. At the
University of California in San Francisco, they have their own robot that prints
prescriptions without making errors. The normal rate of error among pharmacists
is approximately 1 per cent per year, which for the USA amounts to approxi-
mately 37 million small and large errors in the handling of prescriptions (Steiner,
2012: 155). Similar robotization is occurring within reading, synthesis, hypoth-
esis development and hypothesis testing of medical research (Susskind &
Susskind, 2015: 49).
Using robots and informats in the future, a situation may be imagined in
which, when the patient contacts a nursing–technician, it will be possible to carry
out most examinations, diagnoses, medications and prescriptions. The medical
profession in such an imagined reality will take on completely different roles.
Among other things, it would allow the education of doctors to be more
orientated towards the development of new knowledge, and not just the applica-
tion of existing knowledge.
One can also imagine a new type of ‘barefoot’ doctor – a new profession
whose education will provide them with medical, psychological, communications
and technological competence. This new profession will function where today’s
doctors practise. Medical education will in such an imagined scenario have the
possibility of becoming more research orientated, by contrast to today’s medical
education which focuses on research only to a limited extent.
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The professions, businesses and organizations that do not adapt to new
technology will disappear within the space of a few years. The new technology
will be made up of robots, informats and artificial intelligence. In the Fourth
Industrial Revolution, people will learn to live side by side with robots and
informats that will have a greater logical intelligence and a much larger mega-
memory. The first mass production of robots will probably occur in relation to
the care of elderly people. This will of necessity come about because elderly
people (65+) will soon account for a third of the population. In the future, there
will not be enough nurses or resources to take care of all elderly people needing
care. Consequently, robots of various types will perform parts of elderly care that
are provided today. Japan has the longest life expectancy in the world, and
consequently the oldest population. The development of robots has been given
priority in a number of Japanese companies, such as Toyota, Honda, Tokai
Rubber Industries and AIST. Today, Japan leads the world in the development
of robots. This applies to both nursing care robots and industrial robots. The next
step we will see in the development of robots, says Ross (2016: 16–18), will be
robots that are capable of emotional and social interaction.
However, there are several people who are critical of this development,
including MIT’s Professor Sherry Turkle. She questions the role of conversation
in such a robotization, saying that the transfer of knowledge from the elder to the
younger generation will also be jeopardized (Turkle, 2016). There is a possibility
that the older generation will be able to transfer their skills to robots and
informats. In this way, experience will not only be transferred, but also stored
and used. The point that Sherry Turkle overlooks is that conversation and
experience transfer can go through robots to the younger generation. With such
a development, you will not lose the experience of elderly people, and conversa-
tion’s art can be learned via an intermediary – the robot who converses with the
elderly care patient. As the elderly population in the USA and Europe grows
similar to the Japanese, the demand for care-taking robots will explode (Ross,
2016: 19).
The USA, Germany and Japan dominate the market for high-tech medical
robots. If we also take into account South Korea and China, we have the five
countries that produce and consume most robotic systems (Bond, 2013). The
development of these robots is shown in sales statistics. In 2013, 1300 surgical
robots were sold. This represented 41 per cent in value of the total sales of
industrial robots. In the USA, more than one million people have undergone
operations performed by robots, and the number is increasing yearly by 30 per
cent (Ross, 2016: 32). This indicates that the use of robots in medical applica-
tions may currently be in its infancy but it will soon explode (Xie, 2017). In
addition, medical robots will be able to reach places inaccessible to human
surgeons, for example at the neuron level in the brain (Goldberg, 2000).
If the developments as described above stay on track, we will see the
emergence of ‘hospital trailers’ sometime between 2023 and 2045.
The development towards ‘hospital trailers’ will become a reality when two
factors are present:
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1. When nano robots see the light of day. These will be extremely small but will
be able to carry out the diagnosis and medication of various diseases and
measure blood pressure, blood sugar, detect the first signs of cancer tumours,
as well as identify various threshold values that are important to keep under
control.
2. When singularity occurs, i.e. when artificial intelligence becomes equal or
better than human logical intelligence (IQ).
It is argued that singularity will occur between 2023 and 2045 due to Moore’s
law,28 ‘cloud computing’, machine learning, ‘telerobotics’ and ‘data analytics’
(Ross, 2016: 26–27; Goldberg, 2000).
Sub-conclusion
The question we have investigated in this section is: ‘How do knowledge
workers constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Education is only one necessary condition for obtaining a good job. It is also
important that one has attended one of the more prestigious universities. How-
ever, education is not enough. The sufficient condition is the reputation capital
that you have. If you are known to be skilled in idea development, this will
become your reputation capital. If you are skilled in executing ideas, then this
will become your reputation capital. If you deliver products/services well above
the average of the required parameters, then your delivery capacity will be your
reputation capital, and so on. In the global economy, education, which university
the individual has graduated from, his or her talent and his or her personal
reputation are all factors that will secure a job as an innovation and knowledge
worker.
When robots and informats take over some of knowledge and innovation
workers’ functions in organizations and institutions, this will lead to five obvious
consequences.
First, the bureaucracy will partially disappear because the functions of the
bureaucracy will be digitized and taken over by robots.
The second consequence is that hierarchies will change their form and
character. The bureaucracy was an important component of the organizational
hierarchy of the industrial society. When the functions of bureaucracy are taken
over by robots, this means that the hierarchy will also be eroded, together with
bureaucracy.
The third consequence is that management roles will change. There will be
more focus on getting teams and projects to work optimally. At the same time,
creating the future of the business will become an even more important task for
the manager, because the rate of change will increase sharply.
The fourth consequence of pushing down costs and pushing up productivity is
the elimination of the middle class, or at least it will be virtually decimated. The
logic is simple. The middle class is largely linked to control and communication
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functions in organizations and institutions. It is precisely these functions that
robots and informats will take over.
The fifth consequence of the developments described above will be an increasing
inequality in income between the innovation and knowledge workers, on the one
hand, and the precariat and the working poor, on the other. At the same time, we will
see a greater income gap between the various sectors in the precariat, which we have
described above. In addition to this, those who own capital will receive even higher
capital income because of the increase in productivity and the reduction in costs due
to global competition. The sum of these developments will be an increasing inequal-
ity between wage earners. At the same time, we already see a growing inequality
between the income of employees and those who live from profits.
Conclusion
This chapter has explored the following question: ‘How does the workplace of
the future constitute an aspect of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ The short
answer is that we are witnessing the development of four types of workers: the
precariat, the working poor, innovation workers and knowledge workers. We
have structured these four types of workers into a typology. We have described,
analysed and discussed each of the four types.
What we can say at a more general level is that robotization will transform all
the familiar aspects of our working lives. In only a few years from now, robots
will have taken over most of the functions that we currently take for granted as
part of our jobs. There will be changes in all sectors. Farming will be digitized
and robotized. Already we see farmers using drones to make aspects of their
work easier and safer. Tractors will be increasingly self-driven. Drones will
monitor how fast crops are growing, identify pests and conduct precision-
spraying in order to combat plant diseases.
Many of the same developments will apply to fisheries. Instead of flying
drones, we may envisage submarine drones that detect shoals of fish and tell
robots on deck how, when and at what depth to cast the nets. The boats will not
even need to be crewed in order to return to shore. A completely automated
fishing boat is just as realistic a prospect as a self-driven bus. In industry,
industrial robots have greatly changed the nature of many jobs. In the service
industry, Manchester Airport now has a robot cleaner. We already have robots
that care for elderly and sick people.
Hospitals will change character. There will be no need for large hospitals to
establish a greater competence environment. Compact ‘hospital trailers’ will be
able to carry out diagnosis, medication and surgical procedures, as well as follow
up and perform corrective procedures if required.
In the education industry, this will be completely globalized, especially from
around 2025 when we will see the emergence of simultaneous interpretation
robots that use nano-technology and are implanted in the ear without being
visible. When, not if, this happens, we will experience global competition at
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university level. In such a scenario, we will truly experience university educa-
tional programmes at various levels.
Robots will take care of the growing elderly population, and robots will
make life qualitatively better for disabled people. One might ask what type of
education young people should embark on today to prepare them for the
Fourth Industrial Revolution. The only answer that can be given is that you
should take a long education, preferably at a university ranked high on a
global scale, and a postgraduate degree such as Master’s or a PhD. What field
of study you choose is of less importance; the basic rule is that you should do
what you are passionate about and good at. If, on the other hand, you want to
start your own business in the global economy, you should take a year or two
to travel around the world to investigate what’s lacking and which problems
you want to solve, because all innovation is based on a problem or lack of
something.
Whatever you choose to do in the future, new technology will be an essential
part of what you will be dealing with. On the other hand, technology is not the
most important factor for the young person deciding what to do with their future.
It is to learn how to think, which will distinguish the person who is successful
from the one who isn’t. The reasons are straightforward. In a world where
everything is digitized and education is linked to robots, informats and artificial
intelligence, the person with a unique competence will be able to think differ-
ently, and at the same time understand how others think. It is this competence
that will create that which is innovative, and succeed, with both innovations and
new businesses. It is these people who will manage ‘merging concepts’, which
are crucial to creating the new that the world has not seen before.
With regard to future education, it is probable that a type of hybrid education
linked to classical subjects such as philosophy, creativity and philology will
emerge, and capture a large share of the market. Examples of possible hybrids
are philosophy, technology and culture, or biology, technology and philosophy.
The hybrids will make it possible to merge and create a new synthesis of
concepts. This is important because innovations almost always occur at the
boundaries between the various disciplines, for instance bio-technology, nano-
technology, etc.
A positive development at the start of the Fourth Industrial Revolution is that
technology and international trade have resulted in, among other things, 400
million of China’s population emerging from poverty, and about 200 million
well-off people in the growing middle class in that country, with a similar
income to the middle class in the industrialized countries. In addition, the
percentage of people in the world living in extreme poverty and suffering from
hunger has been greatly reduced.
Despite of these developments in countries such as China, we have witnessed
an ever-increasing transformation of the work of millions of people around the
world, because of digitization, robotization, informatization and global free-trade
capitalism forcing people out of work.
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Robotization will most likely crush the middle class in the west, and move them to
other parts of the social hierarchy, such as the precariat, the working poor, as recipients
of a citizen salary, and in a few cases they will advance to the salaried elite.
There are four scenarios that will probably develop in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution. First, there is much to suggest that there will be a development towards
some form of citizen salary being paid to a country’s inhabitants. Second, one can
also imagine a reorganising of the workday from, for example, eight hours to four
hours. The third scenario is that we will witness mass unemployment. The fourth
scenario is linked to the first three. The fourth scenario is based on the four working
groups we have described, analysed and discussed in this chapter.
The fourth scenario sees the development of a whole new structure of working
life. A small propertied class, about 1 per cent of the population, will be super-
rich. A small percentage will belong to the salaried élite. Then we envisage a
large precariat that live from selling their expertise and labour through temporary
contracts. At the bottom we have the working poor who will need several
temporary part-time jobs just to survive. Outside of this hierarchy, we will have
those living on a small citizen’s salary. We have illustrated this new social
stratification in Figure 1.5.
The trend we are witnessing gives rise to the following question: ‘Will we see
the development of technologically driven unemployment due to robots, infor-
mats and artificial intelligence?’ There can be no doubt that it is unskilled
workers who are under threat from the technological developments, the first
outlines of which we are now seeing. The next important question to investigate
is: ‘How can we ensure a decent standard of living for those who, for various







People receiving social benefits,
such as a citizen salary
Figure 1.5 The new social stratification in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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Notes
1 The Danish newspaper, Politikken (26 February 2017) refers to a report finding that
the jobs most likely to proliferate are those with an average monthly pay of DNK
70,000 and those with an average monthly pay of DNK 20,000.
2 The word ‘robot’ was created in 1920 by the Czech author Karel Capek in his play
Rossum’s Universal Robots. The word is an amalgamation of two words: the Old
Church Slavonic word rabota, which means servitude, and robotnik, which is a Czech
word for slave. In Capek’s play, robots are a new class of artificial people who are
enslaved by humans.
3 Informats are robots that are globally interconnected.
4 www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/commission/Oxford_Martin_Now_for_the_
Long_Term.pdf.
5 Ross was part of both the Clinton and the Obama administrations.
6 The term ‘precariat’ is derived from precarious, meaning insecure/risky. In an
employment context, it is difficult for holders of precarious jobs to plan for the future.
7 Guy Standing, interview with Politikken, 28 August 2016.
8 ‘I protect, therefore I obligate.’
9 Guy Standing, interview with Politikken, 28 August 2016.
10 Guy Standing, interview with Politikken, 28 August 2016.
11 The Independent, 14 November, 2015.
12 See the report ‘Freelancing in America’ referred to in Meister and Mulcahy
(2017: xiv).
13 Many of these websites are mentioned in Meister and Mulcahy (2017).
14 Quoted in Ainley (2014: 26).
15 Renana Jhabvala in ‘The self-employed women’s association of India’ in the reviews,
in the first pages of Standing (2014a).
16 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mini_job (date of access: 3 March 2017).
17 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mini_job (date of access: 3 March2017).
18 The description of the Hartz reforms was accessed from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Hartz_concept (date of access: 2 January 2017).
19 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hartz_concept (date of access: 3 March 2017).
20 The strategy was developed around 1988 when Deng Xioping formulated the thesis
that China should export to increase the country’s wealth by allowing foreign
investors to invest in China. His idea was: it doesn’t matter what colour the cat is as
long as it can catch mice. The explanation is that capitalists can invest in China as
long as the Communist Party is in control of social development and they can make
China into a rich country (Pantsov, 2017).
21 By the end of 2004, there were 2236 colleges and universities, with over 20 million
students enrolled in mainland China.[1] More than 6 million Chinese students graduated
from university in 2008.[2] The ‘Project 211’ for creating 100 universities began in the
mid-1990s, and has merged more than 700 institutions of higher learning into about 300
universities. Corresponding with the merging of many public universities, has been the
rapid expansion of the private sector in mainland China since 1999. As of 2006, private
universities accounted for around 6 per cent of student enrolments, or about 1.3 million
of the 20 million students enrolled in formal higher education (https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/List_of_universities_in_China, date of access: 21 February 2017).
22 There are numerous indications that robots, informats and artificial intelligence will
take over most of the work activities that people now perform. Among those who
have written about this development are Standing (2014: viii); Meister and Mulcahy
(2017: 189); Coates and Morrison (2016: 23–59); Grain et al. (2016); Ross (2016: 19–
32); Bond (2013).
23 The figures are from Ross (2016: 41).
24 Politikken at the end of February 2016.
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25 Politikken, 24 February 2017.
26 Politikken, 24 February 2017.
27 Politikken, 24 February 2017.
28 Moore’s law states that computing power will double every second year.
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2 New organizational logic and the
future of work
Introduction
In order to understand the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2016), we must be
able to describe and explain the emergence of the knowledge society. Robots and
informats1 cause changes in employment structures: old jobs are destroyed and new
ones created; work is disrupted and transformed. These trends are a direct outcome of
the transition to the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Arrow, 2012; Abd, 2017; Xie, 2017).
New jobs are being created with completely new kinds of content (Zhao et al., 2017),
and new businesses are starting up at an unknown rate (Hamel, 2012; Christensen,
2016). The decline of industrial employment in the west, and the increasing opportu-
nities for employment in information-related jobs and the service sector are an outcome
of the informatization and automation of work (Acemoglu, 2003; Barrat, 2015; Ross,
2016). The increasing information- and knowledge-related content of jobs is an
expression of the emergence of a new organizational logic, with its own specific
characteristics: lego flexibility and experience design (Baird & Henderson, 2001;
Meister & Mulcahy, 2017). Lego flexibility means, among other things, that the
production chain will be outsourced to several countries in accordance with a cost,
quality, innovation and competence logistic (Susskind & Susskind, 2015; Wiedemer
et al., 2015). By the same logic, the administrative system, and therefore the various
roles of staff members, can also be thought of as being outsourced.
Experience design is an innovative management and organizational model, on
which the focus is on processes and the coupling of customers and workers who
do what the organization is designed to do, i.e. the people on the frontline
(Hamel, 2008; Armstrong, 2014a). This model seems to be gaining ground, at the
expense of bureaucratic and hierarchical principles (Sassen, 2015). Various forms
of experience-based design seem to be establishing themselves as the dominant
pattern (Srinivasa, 2017).
The main question in this chapter is: ‘How can new organizational logic create
wealth in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
We have divided this question into two sub-questions:
1. How can new lego flexibility create wealth in the emergence of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?
2. How can experience design create wealth in the emergence of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?
This is illustrated in Figure 2.1, which also shows how the rest of the chapter is
organized.
Lego flexibility
First we describe and then analyse and discuss lego flexibility, creating a sub-
conclusion.
Descriptions
Lego flexibility means that the production of every product is broken down into
its component parts. These components are produced where the cost is low, the
quality high, the competence excellent, and the innovation rate above average
and high (Garud et al., 2002; Sennett, 2006, 2009). Each of these four elements
brings different components from different parts of the world, but they are finally
brought together to make up the product, which could be a mobile phone, a car, a
computer, etc.
Lego flexibility depends on the existence of an organizational form in which
multifunctional teams form the smallest units and global competence clusters
form the global unit (Azmat, 2012). In addition, it is vital to assign a central role
to knowledge development, knowledge transfer, feedback processes, co-creation
and the analysis of social sentiment (Susskind & Susskind, 2015; Meister &
Mulcahy, 2017).
Information, communication and technology functions could be outsourced,
for example, to the Bangalore region in India, sales functions to Paris, London
and New York, PR and media relations to Berkeley and administrative functions
to Berlin. One could also envisage such a strong focus on core processes that all












Figure 2.1 Wealth creation processes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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There will be enormous social consequences if this type of lego flexibility does
come into effect globally (Standing, 2014a, 2014b), and it will represent the
development of a new form of global work distribution and professional specializa-
tion (Gaskarth, 2015). In this new landscape, competence development, career
development, personal risk and wealth-creation processes will all undergo inherent
change. One result of this kind of lego flexibility will be that sovereign states could
easily lose their grip over wealth-creation processes (Stearns, 2013; Kessler, 2017).
As we know from the industrial era, democratic control over wealth-creation
processes can easily disintegrate, erode and be downgraded to a purely symbolic
level (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Gershuny & Fisher, 2014a).
In the 1980s and 1990s a large part of the workforce moved from industrial
production to jobs in the service and knowledge sectors (Enderwick, 1989;
Foster, 2014). This movement occurred both through cuts in the number of
traditional production jobs and an increase in service and knowledge jobs
(Thurow, 1999: 216). On the threshold of the Fourth Industrial Revolution,
knowledge workers – making up the backbone of the middle class – are now
under threat (Coates & Morrison, 2016), as are service workers (Frey & Osborne,
2013).
We analyse and discuss how this development in the new organizational logic
result in new forms of cooperation, the main driver of which is the new
technology, i.e. robots, informats and artificial intelligence (AI) (Stanford, 2013;
Wilson, 2017).
Analysis and discussion
Lego flexibility, with its consequences such as cutbacks, outsourcing of func-
tions, and its focus on core activities, increased job insecurity and acquisitions to
achieve global competitiveness, will lead to knowledge and service workers
becoming extremely vulnerable (Ford, 2016; Kessler, 2017). This feeling of
vulnerability, failure and inadequacy may soon become the norm (Bernstein,
1996; Gans, 2016). Education and risk-taking will not be enough to succeed, and
tightly packed small social networks will be critical to success in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Garza, 2013). In addition, we should not ignore random
components, although prepared individuals will be better placed to take advan-
tage of any random situations that may arise than those who are not prepared
through education, social networks, political networks and the willingness to take
risks (Gratton, 2011: 105–133).
A consequence of lego flexibility is a feeling of inadequacy, failure, and that
one’s career is not moving in the right direction, and one is a victim of
unforeseeable forces. The reason for this is that lego flexibility increases com-
plexity and turbulence in the global economy to a great degree (Goodman, 2015),
and also that education will no longer be a sufficient criterion for success, as was
the case in the industrial economy (Gupta et al., 2016).
The system of relationships one enters into, i.e. social networks, will become
increasingly important for success (Gershuny & Fisher, 2014). The importance of
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building relationships applies at both the individual and the corporate level
(Foster, 2014), as relationships will enable co-creation, both between individuals
and between customers and the company (Fairtlough, 2007).
Lego flexibility also means that power will be concentrated, but wealth-
creation processes will be distributed (Goodman, 2015). Social ties between the
various modules will be weak, and could easily lead to consequences for
collective solutions, because individualization will be promoted by this lack of
social ties (Chomsky, 2016a, 2016b). Neither individuals nor the nation state will
have the ‘requisite variety’ (Ashby, 1961) needed to cope with the power of
finance capital (Sennett, 2013a, 2013b; Piketty, 2016). One consequence of this
development may be that identity will change from association with trade unions
and the nation to small dense social networks built on collaborative deployment
over time (Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Gollan, 2010).
Another way of analysing the development of lego flexibility is through
responsibility and the social dimension. Responsibility for others will be char-
acterized by relationships within dense, small, robust, social networks (Sennett,
2013a, 2013b), which will maintain the social and material security while
providing identity in the new lego flexibility. These networks will also cover
the psychological need for belonging and feeling needed (Brynjolfsson &
McAfee, 2014).
Lego flexibility may lead to weak ties. If structural connections between social
systems are weak, then a crisis in one place in the global economy will not
necessarily be transferred to another place of equal strength and depth, as is the
case when structural connections are strong (Case, 2016). On the contrary, it
could be the case that, if structural connections are weak, then some areas may
profit from a crisis elsewhere. A crisis can also trigger cost advantages in the
crisis-hit areas, which after some time may gain competitive advantages (Evans
& Schmalensee, 2016). In this way, economic crises may be viewed as a
cleansing process that strengthens the social system once the crisis has subsided.
Lego flexibility is enhanced by new technology, i.e. robots, informats and AI.
This development will demand new competences and new forms of cooperation,
which will drive wealth-creation processes, and ensure greater prosperity for
some who participate in the new workplace pyramid (Fairtlough, 2007; McAffee
& Brynjolfsson, 2017). At the top of this pyramid are the wage nobility (Kessler,
2017), followed by the precariat (Standing, 2014a, 2014b; Johnson, 2015), and
with ‘The working poor’ at the bottom (Shipler, 2005). Outside the workplace
pyramid we find the 1 per cent who own most of the value creation processes
(Dorling, 2015; Wilkins, 2016)
We have seen a larger than usual differential in salary trends and incomes
(Dorling, 2015; Wilkin, 2016; Piketty, 2016), while at the same time productivity
in the service sector has been very low (Susskind & Susskind, 2015). Lego
flexibility will not decrease these trends. Another important point is that the
concept of productivity is in itself in doubt when we talk about the knowledge
economy and lego flexibility, because turbulence and new organizational struc-
tures promote the development of other concepts such as indicators to measure
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performance, e.g. innovation, flexibility, adaptability, relational and networking
competence, and the tackling of complexity and ambiguity (Fisher, 2006;
Gershuny & Fisher, 2014).
If a social system cannot manage the pace of restructuring, i.e. to lego
flexibility, then it is highly likely that this will result in social consequences at
the individual level (Standing, 2014a; Bleuer et al., 2017)., i.e. one should be
aware of the trends and act accordingly (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014).
Struggling against this logic may well give your life meaning, but such a struggle
may be likened to Sisyphus eternally rolling his boulder up a hill, only to watch
it roll back down again destroying everything in its path. A more productive
approach is to be innovative within the framework of new creative network
constellations and adapt to trends that are created by others (Case, 2016). One
could say: ‘Create your own future or others will create it for you’ (Ackoff,
1989).
Economic logic in the globalized era has had the whole globe as a friction-free
market, and this lego flexibility is just one of the consequences of this develop-
ment. In this new reality, wealth-creation processes have changed character from
a logic of production to a logic of global competence clusters (Srinivasa, 2017).
Sub-conclusion
The research question was: How can new lego flexibility create wealth in the
emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
The above description, discussion and analysis have been summarized in



































Figure 2.2 The lego flexibility matrix.
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Experience-design and wealth creation
First we describe, and then analyse and discuss experience-design and wealth
creation, creating a sub-conclusion.
Descriptions
A key aim of the new organizational logic developing in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, regardless of from where the driving forces are coming, is to take
responsibility, and develop creativity in the surrounding environment and the
global competence network, in order to create innovations (Brynjolfsson &
McAfee, 2014). The new organization will look like something that is non-
hierarchical, non-bureaucratic but focused on experience at the frontline, and
exists between customers and people on the frontline. This organizing principle
is called experience-design (Meister & Mulcahy, 2017: xiii–xxx). Experience-
design demands, however, the development of mutual respect in the social
system, where human values are fundamental to the wealth-creation processes.
This is because in a network it is easy for the weakest link to become the one
that causes the whole network to reduce its capacity; as a result every participant
must base their behaviour on certain fundamental values in which individuals
experience well-being from their position within the network and the wealth-
creation processes. This must in no way be confused with equality, or an
egalitarian system, or any particular brand of politics (Bauman, 2013). The
question we address through this line of argument is: ‘What possibilities does
the individual possess to realize a given set of generally accepted values?’ (The
values referred to are, for instance, respect, responsibility and dignity (Benhabib,
2002, 2004; Benhabib et al., 2006).)
If the individual feels that the values in the experience-design are in
agreement with their values, then it will function according to its purpose. If,
however, the individual feels the opposite, then the structure of the experi-
ence-design must be changed, in order to increase the likelihood of a positive
answer to the question.
When people at the frontline can make decisions in real time, this needs a
strong focus on two aspects: first, competence and maintenance of competence at
the frontline, which applies to individual competence, team competence and not
least organization of the business so that the frontline always has support,
serviced and assistance at all levels. Second, it needs coordination between
activities to be optimized at the system and network levels. The new organiza-
tional logic constitutes a transition from functions via cross-functional teams to
process organization, where the customer, user and citizen (the public) are placed
at the centre, and this centre is organized around the frontline. This design is
called here experience-design, because the experience between the customer and
the frontline people happens here. Figure 2.3 shows schematically what we have
described.
46 New organizational logic
Analysis and discussion
In many organizations the frontline is being upgraded in order to interact with
other players in the global sphere (Stanford, 2013; Susskind & Susskind,
2015). Experiences with customers is always at the frontline (Ramaswamy &
Ozcan, 2014; Robertson, 2015). In the industrial society the bureaucratic
system was important as a stabilizing and coordinating factor, but, in the
knowledge society, frontline competence is the crucial factor for wealth
creation and connection with creative and innovative networks (Bleuer et al.,
2017). Accordingly, it is at the frontline that ‘sense and response’ mechanisms
must be developed to capture, and make use of, the stream of experiences that
will ensure survival of the system (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2011; Bleuer
et al., 2017). If it is true that information, experience-design and frontline
focus are essential for wealth creation in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, then
competence at the frontline will become essential for survival (Mason, 2015).
A necessary condition for this is the downscaling of bureaucratic structures,
which should occur rapidly and forcefully, because of robots, informats and AI
(Noonan & Nadkarny, 2016; Wilson, 2017). If this doesn’t occur, then bureau-
cracy will slow down the necessary restructuring processes, and be a cost-
increasing element (Pink, 2001). Creativity and innovation are essential for
wealth creation in the knowledge economy (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2013).
Bureaucracy, with its constraining and stabilizing thought mode, cannot follow
the new transformations that take place, because the speed, flexibility and
decision-making skills in real time are not part of the rational bureaucratic
















Figure 2.3 From vertical organization in hierarchies to process organization towards the
frontline.
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Frontline focus, free agents, e-lance (not freelance but e-work), small, tightly
packed social networks, intrapreneurship, entrepreneurship, innovative entrepre-
neurship, etc. can deal much better with the new challenges and opportunities
than traditional bureaucratic organizations (Susskind & Susskind, 2015; Meister
& Mulcahy, 2017). The Fourth Industrial Revolution will be network connected,
multi-faceted, and adapted to various emerging opportunities and the equally
rapid disappearance of the same opportunities (Schwab, 2016). One common
feature of the Fourth Industrial Revolution could gel as structural connections
that rapidly change character in relation to emerging needs in real time (Ross,
2016). This will need competence as a primary factor to cope with complexities
result from the flexibility of the structural connections (Armstrong, 2014a,
2014b). When competence at the frontline becomes the primary factor, and the
frontline becomes synonymous with decisions made in the social system, then
bureaucracy will inevitably become superfluous. Competence at the frontline,
and collective learning structures among businesses, customers and suppliers, in
addition to flexibility in operating networks and new technology, will form the
basis of the knowledge economy’s wealth-creation processes (Autor et al., 2003).
Robot technology, informats and systemically linked nano-computers will
enable individualized and customized solutions, so that niche production will
become a reality for manufacturers as a result of the global market (Abd, 2017;
Bleuer et al., 2017; Wilson, 2017). Although the customer base and variety in
what they demand will increase sharply, new technology will enable a complete,
individualized relationship with each customer/user (Lima, 2017). The indivi-
dual’s profile will form the basis for a business’s referrals to the customer, and
the customer will generate their profile through contact with the business. This
experience-design will then co-create wealth for both the customers and the
organizations.
It is technology that will create and modify the customer’s profile, so customer
satisfaction will constantly be maximized (Ross, 2016). Individual relationships
and customized solutions for customers will function as a strong competitive
advantage in a development where social ties elsewhere in society become
weaker (Sennett, 2006, 2009, 2013a, 2013b). Examples of products/services that
can be individualized are in the medical field, computers and computer software,
the garment industry, safety equipment, groceries, music, books, entertainment,
news, education, elderly care, etc. (Ford, 2016; Abd, 2017: Xie, 2017).
Individualization may also lead to customers reducing expenditure, because
they will get exactly what they need and no more. This could increase customer
satisfaction and re-purchases may be developed (Winfield, 2012). To achieve this
requires, among other things, deliverability skills. To produce what the customers
want, while still being able to deliver on time, will be an important criterion for
success (Robertson, 2015). A frontline focus and customized solutions will thus
become two important factors for achieving this. Adaptation to the individual
customer requires an innovative system that is focused on continuous change and
co-creation among the system, customer and supplier (Brynjolfsson & McAfee,
2014).
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Those businesses that manage to build an organization and working
methods connected to the new technology, to customize their products/
services, will be in front of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. To this end,
organizing is just as important as technology (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014;
Case, 2016).
The new technology (robots, AI and informats) increasingly enables individua-
lized service. Customers can now more easily be classified by contact, and directed
to the specific staff to handle the individualized solutions to the customer’s request.
Customers no longer have to be exposed to the internal processes and they can be
directed to the specific staff at the frontline with the expertise to deal with their
request. In the future their requests will be answered by robots in real time without
delay (Abd, 2017; Bleuer et al., 2017; Wilson, 2017). Viewed from this perspective,
technology will be used to differentiate customers so that the service is appropriate
to the individual customer (Barrat, 2015; Xie, 2017). In this way, the products/
services will literally be customized for each customer. Re-purchase by the existing
customer base will also become a criterion for success when the customer is the
critical factor (Ramaswamy & Ozcan, 2014). Consequently, every transaction with
the customer will lead to experience transfer and learning by the system, so at the
next point of transaction the customer will have a new updated profile. Such a
experience-design in which a customer-learning system can be employed in several
areas, such as the sale of books, music, films, news, entertainment, clothing,
research services, educational services, groceries, furniture, library services, bank-
ing, medical services, lawyers services, teachers services etc., will increase business
results (Robertson, 2015; Wilson, 2017).
It is rather a question of which areas cannot be covered by the new customizing
robotic systems. An important point with such customer-learning systems is to
retain the customer by either providing products and services or offering what
customers are looking for in the network that the business is a part. The business
must therefore offer links to other businesses, which must be included in a network
where such a return of favours is part of its function. This can be done by digital
machines, robots, informats using AI and other organizational techniques.
The relationship with the customer is a direct one, and the business adapts its
products and services to the individual customer. This relationship can be more
efficient with robots and informats than with personal contact. By offering other
links to the customer, learning will increase further, because the business would
gain a larger and better overall profile of each customer than would be possible if
the profile were created only around the products/services supplied by the
business (Stanford, 2013). Being a total information provider is therefore very
important for the individual business, with the aim always to provide services in
relation to all the customer’s needs, and thus psychologically binding the
customer to the business. This binding is done by linking the customer via
robots and informats with the global system, through the hotspot of the single
company. The customer must experience information offered by the business as
relevant; if not, information delivery will be perceived as negative (Hislop,
2013).
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One consequence of the individualized customization and upgrading of com-
petence in the frontline is, among other things, a transition from hierarchical
management and control systems to more vertical systems of organization and
management (Hlupic, 2014).
The key features of the new organizational logic resulting from the frontline




• A large degree of external structural links;
• Continuous competence development at all levels.
The critical factor in experience-design concerns our mental models, and how
we think about the changes that have been made and the ones we know will
occur in the future (Meister & Mulcahy, 2017). From such an understanding,
robots, informats and AI should be considered as a means of changing the
organizational logic. Performance improvements, for example in the knowledge
workers’ productivity, will be a result of the new organizational logic, rather than
the new technology (Stanford, 2013; Susskind & Susskind, 2015; Wilson, 2017).
Viewed from this perspective, the new technology will be a midwife to the new
organizational logic (Kiggins, 2017). The new robot technology and the systemi-
cally linked informats, and even the nano-computers, will be the unifying glue in
the organizational spider’s web, which holds everything together in a very strong,
systemically linked system (Johannessen, 2016b).
Sub-conclusion
The research question was: ‘How can experience-design create wealth in the
emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ We answered this question by
focusing on the interaction between the frontline and the customers, systemically
linked to robots and informats in a global competence cluster. It is this interac-
tion that will create wealth in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Figure 2.4 summarizes the above description, discussion and analysis. It is also
the answer to our research question.
Conclusion
The main question we investigated in this chapter is: ‘How can new organiza-
tional logic create wealth in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Wealth-creation processes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution are structured
around two wealth-creation elements (see Figure 2.1): lego flexibility and
experience-design.
The synthesis of these elements of wealth creation and the overarching answer
to our main research question are presented figuratively in Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5 How can new organizational logic create wealth in the emergence of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?
Below, in response to the main research question, we suggest some tentative
syntheses and some questions for further research.
Lego flexibility
A network logic has been the key driving force in the development of the
knowledge economy. However, to a large extent it is the major multinational
corporations that will play a decisive role in the development of such dynamic
networks. Although one may find a number of examples where small- and
medium-sized businesses have been fundamental to networking logistics, as, for
example, in north Italy, there appears to be a transition from large companies
towards global competence networks and global competence clusters. These
global networks will focus on specialized niche companies, which act as ‘Lego
bricks’ or modules in a global wealth-creation process. These modules are the
organizational logistics that drive the development of the global competence
networks, and the owners of these networks are the large-scale entities of global
capitalism: funds of various types. These funds may be owned by trade unions,
large pension funds, or to a small, and even insignificant, extent individuals and
families. Our point is, however, that these new organizational logistics bind the
fox and the hens together in the hen house in a fiendish pact: no one is served by
disrupting the stability of these unstable dynamic networks.
Lego flexibility – further research
Sometimes sheep flee to escape when they see wolves coming. At other times
sheep will blindly follow other sheep if they see them running. Then again, they
may even flee because they mistake the wind rustling in the trees for wolves
approaching. The idea here is that, if everybody or many follow the same
strategy, the result may be disaster for the system as a whole, which is what
happens in flocking behaviour. On this basis we ask the following questions for
further research:
• In which way will global competence clusters impact the design of new
information management structures?
• In which way will ‘Lego bricks’ or modules impact the design of new
information management structures?
Experience-design
Classic industrial production will be executed by automated processes using robots and
informats operated by technology workers who will work remotely from the actual site
of production. The classic industrial worker will become a largely historical figure.
Information and knowledge will be interwoven into social relationships, and in
many contexts will be for the collective good. Given the information networks
that exist today, it is impossible to monopolize theoretical knowledge. It is
produced and reproduced in a global network of information and knowledge
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workers, which to an ever greater extent creates value at the frontline level that it
encounters, and often in collaboration with clients, customers, students, etc. This
experience-design enables co-creation at the frontline, where learning will bring
productivity gain and customer satisfaction.
Experience-design – future research
The global competence clusters, level of technology, infostructure and infrastruc-
ture will be decisive in success or failure in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. A
danger in the knowledge economy is an absence of long-term thinking, because it
is precisely long-term investments in research, infostructures, infrastructures, etc.
that will be necessary in an era where thinking will be dominated by short-term
interests.
On this basis we ask the following questions for further research:
• In which way will experience-design impact the design of new information
management structures?
• In which way will a distinction between infostructures and infrastructures
impact the design of new information management structures?
Note
1 Informats are robots that are globally interconnected.
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3 Innovation and the future of work
Introduction
Any social system that fails to balance stability and change, and at the same time
be innovative, will not be able to steer the ship at a time of increasing complexity
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Christensen, 2016). Postponing restructuring to
prevent social consequences can be compared with an alcoholic trying to cure his
hangover by ‘a hair of the dog’ strategy (i.e. taking another drink); such a
strategy inevitably leads to the alcoholic ‘falling off the wagon’ (i.e. relapsing
into alcoholism again). Similarly with social systems: the social consequences
will only increase the more you employ this strategy. What one gains in time by
postponing the consequences, one loses in energy, creativity, vitality and the
long-term survival of the system (Hlupic, 2014; Goodman, 2015). The ability to
change and innovate at the same time as maintaining stability is the test that any
viable social system must undergo during the transition to the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (Schwab, 2016).
At a general level, several authors have identified three features of the
emergence of the information society (Machlup, 1962, 1981; Bell, 1971, 1979;
Touraine, 1988; Toffler, 1990; Dordick & Wang, 1993; Drucker, 1999, 1999a;
Thurow, 1999; Standing, 2014; Johnson, 2015):
1. Competence and talent will become an increasingly important factor for
productivity;
2. The service sector will become the dominant source of employment;
3. Freelancers will comprise a key element of the employment structure.
These three features will bring extreme specialization and cascades of innova-
tions to the front of the information economy.
The point that the service sector will be the dominant provider of employment
does not mean that industrial production will be less significant in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. To the contrary, it will be very important, but not
necessarily as a source of employment, either in long-established industrial
nations or globally in newly established industrial centres, according to the
robotization of the economy. Many jobs in the service and information/
knowledge sectors are in fact dependent on industrial production and linked to it
in various ways (Cohen & Zysman, 1987; Bauman, 2011; Kiggins, 2017).
The transition to the Fourth Industrial Revolution changes the employment
structure in all industries (Lima, 2017; Wilson, 2017). Consequently, wealth-
creation processes are also changing, due to changes in organizational logic and
new technology (Bennis et al., 2012; Xie, 2017). It is becoming increasingly
difficult to define and delimit what constitutes commodity production and services
production, e.g. consider the following list as an example: software production,
video production, design of mobile phones, design of hi-fi systems, design of cars,
biotech aquaculture, biotech agriculture, robot fishery, drone agriculture, etc. An
essential point here is that the extent of information and knowledge is increasing,
both as input and in the final product of wealth-creation processes (Brynjolfsson &
McAfee, 2011; Gershuny & Fisher, 2014).
Important in this context is the fact that how we organize and manage
information and knowledge resources has a direct impact on what knowledge
we develop and have access to (Case, 2016). However, ‘how knowledge behaves
as an economic resource we do not yet fully understand. We need an economic
theory that puts knowledge into the centre of the wealth producing process’
(Drucker, 1993: 167).
Between 1920 and 1970 in the G7 countries, there was a clear decline in
employment in agriculture, but relatively stable employment in the industrial
sector (Castells, 2015). However, between 1970 and 2010, the trend was
different with a reduction in industrial employment (Bratianu, 2015). At the
start of the Fourth Industrial Revolution in the G7 countries, services, informa-
tion and knowledge occupations constitute the major part of the workforce
(Brockbank, 2013; Charnock & Starosta, 2016). In other words, there has been
a transition from work-intensive to capital-intensive jobs at the end of the
twentieth century. Now we see the transition from information- and knowledge-
intensive jobs to an increasing demand for innovation-intensive jobs (Barrat,
2015; Bleuer et al., 2017).
The question we examine here is the following: ‘Which factors influence
wealth-creation processes in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
The questions asked to answer the main question are:
1. How does extreme specialization constitute wealth-creation processes in the
emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
2. How do the cascades of innovation constitute wealth-creation processes in
the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?
The aim is to develop concepts and models that can be used when analysing
organizational aspects in order to promote wealth-creating processes in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution. The vision is to develop a conceptual basis for a
new organizational logic in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the introduction and is also the way in which we have
organized this chapter.
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Extreme specialization
Description
A particular feature of the information society is the global market for capital
and competence. New technology makes the division of production, of both
physical and virtual products, possible (Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2013). One of
the consequences of this division is that production and administration are
outsourced globally and integrated into different types of global competence
clusters (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). In this manner, the tendency towards
extreme specialization is reinforced. Power is concentrated in a system of
relations and a system of positions that are embedded in the different competence
networks competing for attention (Case, 2016). These networks create the
identities that are developed by people and organizations, and segment the
market and exploit different niches in their habitats in order to survive (Fairtlough,
2007). The greatest levelling process will occur among these different networks,
but there will also be a significant levelling process within each network (Castells,
2009, 2009a, 2015). Such a development may easily lead to a situation in which
acceptance of greater differences becomes engrained in our way of thinking
(Dorling, 2015).
When networks expand and monetary values take control of various domains,
global power will take on an entirely different meaning (Wilkin, 2016). The
global networks will gain greater control of national taxation policies, regional
and investment policies, etc., because of the ease of moving capital and expertise
in the global economy (Dickinson, 2016). If the networks are not comfortable
with the regulatory frameworks, then they will merely ‘flag out’ to other global
locations that can fulfil their requirements (Chomsky, 2012; McGill, 2016). The
influence of the nation-state will thus be reduced in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution (Case, 2016; Ford, 2016).
We always make observations on the basis of concepts and our experiences
(Hamel, 2008: xvii–xix). Subsequently, we can say that truth is socially conditioned
by the historical situation in which it occurs (Merton, 1967: 514). Against this
background, it may be said that the experiences acquired by the global competence










Figure 3.1 Wealth-creation processes in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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becomes extremely important that the globalization of financial networks is met with
a political network that is of at least the same calibre, so that the political context can
provide the requisite variety (Ashby, 1961) to deal with the increasing complexity
that arises.
Analysis and discussion
With their expertise and willingness to take the initiative and show commitment, the
information and knowledge worker participates in the Fourth Industrial Revolution
in various systems and competence networks (Coates & Morrison, 2016). From the
businesses and networks in which they are active, they expect flexibility, autonomy,
freedom and rewards based on delivered results (Drucker, 1999; Hamel, 2012). The
new knowledge worker may be involved in various projects and criss-crossing
networks, which may be partly in competition with each other (Drucker, 2005).
The knowledge worker in such businesses and networks is, to an increasing extent, a
free agent in relation to these conflicting interests. These free agents, or ‘the
company of one’ (Lane, 2011) manages their own careers and flow of income.
They create their own jobs within or outside a larger organization connected to a
global network of expertise (Drucker, 1999a). The projects they generate are linked
to competence, ambition and their private lifestyle (Florida, 2014). These free agents
take part in projects and networks with more or less independent contracts for one or
more systems. Their workplace may be home based, in a holiday cottage, their car, a
tourist hotel, a tropical island, etc.; indeed, I personally know of someone who has
their permanent ‘work address’ on cruise ships around the world. This is possible
because the only thing they need is a computer and internet access. Cyberspace is
their workplace (Dickinson, 2016). The working hours of this new knowledge
worker are similar to those of the part-time project worker, although they participate
in many different projects with different clients. Moreover, they work flexitime, in
the real meaning of the word; flexibility is so great that new knowledge workers
need to impose on themselves an almost neurotic work discipline, adapted to their
own biorhythm (Goodman, 2015).
The new knowledge workers are the base units of the global networks. They
often start their own businesses in connection with the organization(s) with
which they have work relationships, and by their initiatives can change the
direction of the whole of the established network. In this situation, the assump-
tion is that knowledge workers feel that they gain something from the initiative
in some way: independence, self-actualization, symbolic distinctions and a high
degree of vanity are their driving forces (Florida, 2014). They are not hemmed in
by trying to climb bureaucratic ladders or positioning themselves in traditional
hierarchical power structures (Mason, 2015). They are guided by themes,
problems, phenomena and challenges, and have little or no loyalty to or identity
with the organization that happens to pay their salary. Their identity is related to
problem and thematic areas.
The ‘good life’ is a basic foundation for these people, although what consti-
tutes the good life varies for different knowledge workers. One thing that seems
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to be common to many of them is that wages in one form or another are an
important mechanism that can enable them to attain the necessary freedom to
develop their own version of the good life. They do not work to live, their work is
their life and their hobby, and therefore the good life is related to their everyday
work routines, not a strategy aimed at the ‘good life’ in retirement (Gollan, 2010;
Jemielniak, 2014). They are effectively already ‘retired’ while they’re working,
because they can do their jobs as if it were their ‘pastime’. They are what one might
call the ‘golf-playing workers’, only they play golf while they are working. Leisure
time is also their ‘business time’ (Gollan, 2010; Hanson, 2016). The characteristics
that come out of this analysis are the self-centred, dynamic, ego-oriented, yet
rational, solidarity-focused person, i.e. solidarity focused in so much as it serves
their own interests. This analysis is an interpretation of research on the subject by
Richard Sennett (1999, 2003, 2006, 2009, 2013), among others.
When businesses experience a growing recruitment problem, the first to jump
ship are precisely those knowledge workers the business does not want to lose,
because they are the most attractive in an expanding market. A strategy for
retaining these workers will not necessarily be to offer them a market wage, but
be related to what the individuals define as the good life for themselves. For
instance, it may be the opportunity to work as free agents in relation to the
organization, or depend on specific ways of working, or the opportunity of giving
them access to exclusive networking, etc. One consequence of the new extreme
specialization in the Fourth Industrial Revolution is that more knowledge work-
ers will be carrying out tasks for several organizations, linked to different
networks, in which small, tightly packed, social networks constitute the basic
unit (Foster, 2014). Knowledge and service workers of various types will, to an
ever greater extent, be engaged on a project basis, which, among other things,
may lead to control over their own time being more meaningful (Florida, 2014).
At the organizational level, the whole will be subdivided into smaller viable
systems that operate independently, while serving the networks of which they are
a part (Gershuny & Fisher, 2014). This complexity means that individual less-
viable systems, which previously functioned as units, functions, processes and
activities in the classic hierarchy, now operate as autonomous units in a
complementary logic (Gupta et al., 2016). This logic may be named information
management meta-design, as shown in Figure 3.2. Each of the units in Figure 3.2
is viable in the sense that it is part of a network that compiles the parts into a
functioning whole (Niland et al., 1994; Lima, 2017). An essential purpose of
extreme specialization is that the individual modules focus on executing narrow
functions (Roat, 2016). The system of these modules in Figure 3.2 operating in a
network ensures the requirements of generalization, and thus promotes context
competence (Global Wealth Report, 2015). In this way, extreme specialization
protects both in-depth expertise through specialization and breadth expertise
through development of contextual knowledge, i.e. being able to understand the
part and the whole perspective of interaction and coherence (Johannessen,
2016a). This part–whole competence that extreme specialization promotes,
through the information management meta-design principles in Figure 3.2, helps

























































































































































































to lay the ground for pattern understanding. It also helps to promote competition
and cooperation within and between networks in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution.
Organizing and leadership in extreme specialization are coordinated in a
web-like structure of mediators, in which control impulses are determined by
the system of relationships and positions in other networks (Monbiot, 2016).
The mediating activity flourishes in such an organizational logic, where cost
and quality focus are strong, because the individual units do not directly
transfer competence from other units in the network, but must develop
survival strategies based on connections to larger and expanding networks
on a global basis (Noonan & Nadkarny, 2016). This will require mediators
with the necessary part–whole understanding, i.e. the understanding of
information management meta-design functions (see Figure 3.2). This will
lead to a contextual and relational competence that connects the parts on a
global basis to a functioning system for a specific time-limited activity
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development or OECD,
2014). A very clear consequence of this development is that employment
conditions will be revolutionized in this new information management meta-
design structuring of the global economy (Petras & Veltmeyr, 2011; Petras
et al., 2013).
In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, manufacturing processes will also change
significantly. The robotization of the production workers’ and knowledge and
service workers’ activities will be necessary to increase productivity (Rojecki,
2016). Robotization will lead to production workers distancing themselves from
production and working through automations, computers, informats1 and various
intermediate technological networks. In turn, informatization will lead to hierar-
chies turning in new directions, so that the frontline2 comes into focus. One
consequence of this development is that bureaucratization and control functions
will be reduced and often removed, or replaced by informats and robots (Xie,
2017; Zhao et al., 2017). Informatization leads further to what we metaphorically
may term ‘robotic control’. This refers to small nano-computers found in physical
objects that are connected to global networks (Abd, 2017; Wilson, 2017). Produc-
tion, distribution, coordination and integration processes are robotically connected
via various networks shaping the coming of informats (Frankish, 2014; Jemielniak,
2012). Digitalization and informatization also mean that the administrative infor-
mation processes will be performed robotically through computer-like informats
connected in a tightly structured global network (Lima, 2017).
The informats and robots may be of various types that access their computing
power from the network, which is strengthened by connections to other informats
and robots, i.e. the development of the global brain. Consequently, the capacity
of the individual physical computers is not of interest; the interconnected robots
are emerging into informats (Wilson, 2017; Zhao et al., 2017).
A social consequence of this development is that fewer people will have
insight into the part–whole knowledge. The individual elements will conceivably
be spread in the global network. In Figure 3.2, we included 20 functions and
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processes, which theoretically could be spread across the globe; however, all the
functions and processes must be present for a specific product or service to be
delivered (Miller, 1978).3 In such a situation, the classic management and control
mechanisms will change and possibly disappear to be replaced by new ones
(Stanford, 2013; Foster, 2014; Goodman, 2015).
Sub-conclusion
The question asked was: ‘How does extreme specialization constitute wealth-
creation processes in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Extreme specialization leads to the rewriting of the social contract, and the
social contract among businesses, workers and society will change dramatically
in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Attributes such as creativity, commitment, adaptability, willingness to change,
flexibility, friendliness, generosity and ability to innovate will all be in high demand.
Extreme specialization and robotic control lead to the emergence of a new type of
production, information, knowledge and service worker. One requirement for these
will inevitably be an understanding of robots and informats, and an increasing
degree of relational skills. This will require more abstract thinking,
Extreme specialization will enable production to be moved to areas around the
globe where costs, expertise, creativity, innovation and quality are more optimal
than in other areas. Extreme specialization in the Fourth Industrial Revolution
will promote these developments, because it is extremely dependent on informa-
tion and communication processes in technological networks.
Cascades of innovation and wealth creation
Description
‘Ground Zero’ for the information society is cascades of innovation changing the
workplace and society. These changes will affect people in ways that may make them
no longer feel that work is central to a sense of meaning in their lives (Standing, 2014).
Already people feel less of a commitment to the jobs they already have.4
Technological development will lead to cascades of innovations (Hamel, 2008,
2012), which will affect economic growth, skills and expectations of the future in very
different ways from what we have experienced previously, because the speed, feed-
back and distribution of ideas in the network will occur very quickly (Roat, 2016).
Productivity will increase dramatically due to robotization, which will promote an
exponential economic growth (Rodrik, 2011; Rosa &Mathys-Treio, 2015). However,
wages will not necessarily follow productivity growth (Hanson, 2016).
Innovation cascades will occur with a rapidity not previously seen (Hanson,
2016; Noonan & Nadkarny, 2016), which will lead to minor and major economic
staccato behaviour in the social system, because closures will be as common as
innovation cascades. As a consequence, innovations will demolish established
businesses and industries, which will be perceived as economic and social crises
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by those affected by these cascades (Johannessen, 2016). The labour market will
change as rapidly as the innovation cascades enter the market (Hanson, 2016),
with most jobs being experienced as unsafe, which will affect cohesion in the
workplace and the role of trade unions (Rosa & Mathys-Treio, 2015; Bauman,
2013). When work is substituted by various types of robots, the traditional
relationship between the employee and the purchaser of labour will change
radically (Hanson, 2016; Sennett, 2013). In order to sell their expertise in this
market, the simultaneous process of specialization and generalization will form a
foundation for talent development, both on the individual level and in educa-
tional institutions (Pink, 2001; Charnock & Starosta, 2016).
In some instances, ‘Ground Zero’ in the information society concerns a
transition from areas with heavy industry, such as the iron and steel industry, to
areas of high technology (Petras et al., 2013; Sennett, 2013). The location of
heavy industry usually depended on energy supply, whereas the location of high-
tech industry depends on talent supply. One example of this ‘Ground Zero’ effect
in the knowledge economy is Youngstown, Ohio, in the so-called Rust Belt. The
town grew up on the steel industry, but, after bankruptcies, outsourcing and
competition from India and China, Youngstown became a ghost town almost
overnight. However, today in Youngstown, and in other steel and coal towns in,
for example, the Ruhr area in Germany, a belt of high-technology businesses has
sprung up. It is these high-tech businesses that symbolize development in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution (Mason, 2015; Meister & Mulcahy, 2017).
Those who manage to adapt to the cascades of innovations from this ‘Ground
Zero’ are thus winners in the information society (Wacquant, 2007, 2009; Swider,
2015). Those of the knowledge workers who don’t manage to adapt will be the
unemployed knowledge workers, who are often people with relatively long uni-
versity educations, either Bachelor’s or Master’s degrees, but who are unable to find
employment after they have completed their education (Coates & Morrison, 2016).
Young people who have only Bachelor’s degrees are the future ‘industrial
workers’. Those students who have vocational Bachelor’s degrees may be
likened to skilled workers in industrial society. However, those students who
have a general Bachelor’s education that isn’t professionally or vocationally
oriented may be likened to unskilled workers in industrial society (Coates &
Morrison, 2016; Dickinson, 2016). This means that knowledge and work are no
longer interconnected, and a good university education is no longer any guaran-
tee of permanent employment (Gupta et al., 2016).
Inequality appears to increase at an exponential speed in the information
society, represented by the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Piketty, 2014, 2016;
McGill, 2016). Solidarity in the workplace and the labour collective, which char-
acterized the Second and sometimes the Third Industrial Revolutions, will be
replaced by individual contract workers selling their labour like hirelings in the
Middle Ages (Wacquant, 2009a; Sennett, 2013). The competition for jobs will
increase the pushing down of wages, even if productivity increases (Bauman, 2013;
Sprague, 2014). The community of workers in the traditional working class will be
replaced by contract workers, freelancers, voluntary enterprises, entrepreneurs,
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project workers, ‘the company of one’, etc. (Gupta et al., 2016; Srinivasa, 2017).
Robots, informats, artificial intelligence (AI) and the new nano-computers, systemi-
cally connected in a global network, will take over much of the work activities.
Analysis and discussion
Cascades of innovations will lead to constant disruptions in the way we work
(Sennett, 2013), creating new winners and losers, affecting our relationships and
not least our expectations for the future (Hanson, 2016). Uncertainty will become
the norm, whereas inequality will be a necessary condition for society’s cohesion
and development (Bauman, 2013; Piketty, 2016).
Global organizations will steer the development of nations (Case, 2016), which
must find new ways of defining democracy in order to take part in the emerging
feudal capitalism of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Feudal structures will be
developed not only at an organizational level but also at a national level (Mason,
2015; Dickinson, 2016; McGill, 2016). According to both Hanson (2016) and
Rosa and Mathys-Treio (2015), the great changes in people’s lives, both in the
present and in their expectations of the future, will lead to a revolt against
national governing authorities. The time between when people ‘have had enough’
and when the authorities intervene to implement changes will increasingly
become less (Savage, 2015). On the other hand, disgruntled individuals will
connect to new technological platforms so that discontent will spread rapidly
(Case, 2016). The time for the authorities to analyse, discuss and reflect issues
will be reduced, and result in a staccato-type behaviour, and ad-hoc communities
will most probably develop (Sennett, 2013; Bauman, 2013). Against this back-
ground, democracy may be reformulated to stability through feudal structures, a
form of democracy, through bank committees (Wacquant, 2009, 2009a).
If the above analysis is correct then rapidity linked to Ashby’s law of requisite
variety (Ashby, 1961) will develop. This means that the authorities will always have
the necessary resources to intervene against any dissatisfaction that may surface.
The necessary prerequisite for achieving this is a powerful and extensive
bureaucracy. The power asymmetry may easily lead to further enhancement of
conflicts between citizens and governments. In this way, the bureaucracy will
function as a shackle on democracy, because citizens will easily associate democ-
racy with the bureaucracy, and thus react against democracy, wanting something
different, something stable and predictable. In this case, feudal structures may be
the solution for the authorities, if not for democracy. The circle will thus be
complete. The Fourth Industrial Revolution will promote a form of feudal
capitalism and a feudal state structure. Employees will be the new hirelings in
such a structure (Petras et al., 2013; Wiedemer et al., 2015; Roat, 2016).
The cascades of innovations in the Fourth Industrial Revolution will dominate;
they will govern the development of all structures. Although the desire for
stability and predictability will be prominent, this desire may be overridden by
cascades of innovation and their destructive forces at all levels: the individual,
organizational and national.
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Dynamic collaborative networks among people, institutions, regions, countries
and groups of countries will be an important driver of the information economy in
its early stages (Castells, 2009, 2015). This also means that national boundaries
will be of less importance than before. On the other hand, how they act to facilitate
their participation in this development will be important for the integration of
individual states into the global economy. This is thus a two-sided process in
which development, on the one hand, is driven by forces that the nation state has
no control over, whereas, on the other, the nation state’s involvement will be very
important in relation to how various collaborative networks connect the national
state to the global economy (Chomsky, 2012; Charnock & Starosta, 2016).
Concentration in various types of innovative environments appears to be a
social mechanism behind both dynamic collaborative networks and loose social
organizations that promote innovation and wealth creation, and rebellion against
the distribution of wealth creation (Castells, 2015; McGill, 2016).
The development of innovative environments is a task for established institu-
tions, such as universities, colleges, authorities of various kinds or other institu-
tions with good organizational skills. However, an important mechanism is also to
create loose connections to new innovators, allowing offshoots and new branches
to develop without established institutions managing the processes. In this way,
internal dynamics will be created, attracting the necessary skills, investments and
interest from a market. When this happens investments in the new emerging
innovations will lead to flocking behaviour; everyone will have a bit of the pie.
This flocking behaviour leads in the end to bubbles bursting, and when this
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Figure 3.3 Cascades of innovation lead to minor and major economic and social crises.
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Sub-conclusion
The question asked was: ‘How does cascades of innovation constitute wealth-
creation processes in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
The short answer is that cascades of innovation create wealth by destructing
the old wealth-creation processes at the same time as creating the new
processes. When this happens, cascades of innovation create creative destruc-
tion at all levels, individual, organizational and societal. In the end disruption
cleans up social systems and opens up new cascades of innovations, so the
circle repeats itself.
Conclusion
The question we have investigated in this chapter is: ‘Which factors influence
wealth-creation processes in the emergence of the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Below, we suggest some tentative syntheses in response to this research question.
Robots, nano-computers and informats will interact with each other, permeat-
ing all areas of employment; figuratively, this could be imagined as neurons
interacting in the human brain (see Figure 3.2). Familiarity with contexts and the
direct ‘hands-on’ contact required by traditional industrial production will be
given less emphasis, which will have enormous implications for educational
institutions, and their educational programmes and methods
The robots, nano-computers in networks and informats will be characterized
by a tripartite organization. First, the market will be developed for robot operators
who will not need background knowledge other than experience in the work they
perform, i.e. they are skilled production workers and will receive the appropriate
training. Second, the traditional knowledge professions will be developed by
reinforcing their knowledge base in relation to the design and development of the
informats. Third, new disciplines and professions will be developed that design,
develop and maintain robotic machines, informats and nano-computers.
This tripartite division will revolutionize the education market at all levels and,
at the same time, new symbolic distinctions will be created. In other words, new
hierarchies will be developed based on symbolic divisions.
The Fourth Industrial Revolution will most likely replace the pyramid hier-
archies. However, this must not be misunderstood as the development of greater
power distribution and equality in the system; it just means that power will
change character. It is probable that various types of structurally connected
competence networks will emerge, in which the system of relationships and
positions provides control impulses. At the same time, the integration of such
networks will be based on a set of norms and values where rational solidarity
reigns, i.e. one shows solidarity because one benefits from it.
The economy, the outlines of which we can detect in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution, is global, innovative and, to a large extent, technology driven. This
element of globalism and innovation suggests that the speed of future changes
may transform social systems worldwide in a rapid and brutal manner.
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In the information economy, rapid economic upturns may rapidly transform to
economic stagnation and downturns in specific geographical areas worldwide. In
this kind of economy, innovation will be the most important competitive factor.
Talent and expertise will become the social mechanism that triggers necessary
social processes promoting extreme specialization and innovation. New technol-
ogy, robotization and systemically connected nano-computers will promote
information, communication and networking processes in and between busi-
nesses and systems of businesses. In this manner, time and distance will be
eliminated around the globe with new technology.
The consequences of this will include an increasing rate of innovation and
with it turbulence, the latter being augmented by the fact that global competence
clusters will be working 24/7. These 24/7 networks will be the new mode of
working.
In such an economy, it will not help to be the best at something within
one’s geographical area, because there will always be new arrivals who are
better, more aggressive, and use unfamiliar and more ruthless methods of
competition.
The main factor that influence wealth-creation processes in the emergence of
the Fourth Industrial Revolution is cascades of innovation. The social mechan-
isms creating these cascades is extreme specialization. The chapter summarizes
the answer to the following question: ‘How can we know where the next
innovations will emerge, so we can prepare a policy to hamper some of the
consequences?’ Figure 3.4 gives a response to this question.
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Figure 3.4 The emergence of innovations.
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The social mechanism that is absolutely essential to drive these processes of
creative destruction is the existence of people who are willing to take risks, and
entrepreneurs who see opportunities for profit where others see problems and
limitations. In such a situation, if we have a culture that limits processes of
creative destruction, wealth creation will be significantly restricted. Wealth-
creation processes in the new information economy require changes to be made
to the structures that were necessary to the industrial economy, because the
establishment has a tendency to want to uphold the status quo, and change
always contains the potential for power shifts.
The development of a culture of entrepreneurship is essential for wealth creation
in the knowledge economy, because competence and technology must be coupled to
a willingness to take risks in order to provide opportunities for the new to emerge.
It appears that four criteria must be satisfied in order to build effective social
mechanisms for wealth-creation systems in the Fourth Industrial Revolution:
1. Competitive educational systems;
2. Competitive infra- and infostructures;
3. Competitive research systems; and
4. Competitive entrepreneurship systems.
These four criteria should be investigated further in order to understand and
apply in practice.
Notes
1 Informats are robots that are globally interconnected.
2 Those who work in direct interaction with the customer, patients, students, users, etc.
3 The 20 functions are derived from Miller (1978), but the symbols are obtained from
Johannessen (1990).
4 Seventy per cent of those questioned in a large survey by Gallup in 2014 show a
declining job satisfaction (Information, 22 June 2016).
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4 Powershift in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution
Introduction
We are experiencing a new trend in organizational logic that has two aspects. On
the one hand, the spirit of entrepreneurship seems to becoming an international
role model (Cao et al., 2010) and, on the other, well-established businesses are
currently undergoing significant restructuring with major social consequences
(Garud et al., 2002; Barrat, 2015). This restructuring is not a new phenomenon.
What is new, however, is the unaccustomed speed and ability for focusing on
global information processes, robots, artificial intelligence (AI), digitalization and
demands for return on capital in this recent restructuring (Carayannopoulos,
2009; Case, 2016).
Simultaneously, this is used as an argument for the necessity to maintain
productivity and competitiveness. Organizations must be profitable enough to
compete for investment capital, short-term speculative capital and long-term
working capital (Frey & Osborne, 2013; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). When
ever more people invest their savings in funds of various types, they expect a
higher rate of return than keeping money in the bank. Consequently, investors
demand higher returns. In order to achieve this, there is a focus on costs and
innovation in businesses, and the social systems surrounding these businesses.
This leads to an increasing focus on what the system is designed to do, and thus
a separation from those processes that do not directly support the business’s main
concept. The result is new ways of working and an emergence of a powershift in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2016). In addition, although some
businesses may be making a profit they are nevertheless ‘wound down’, because
there are greater profits to be had by moving them to low-cost countries. At the
same time, the focus is oriented towards new ideas, innovation and creativity,
both within established companies and in start-up businesses. This processes
leads to urbanization into cities and mega-cities1 (Graham, 1994), and in these
cities the new innovation centres of the fabric of knowledge are drawn towards
the urban centre (Graham, 1994; Graham & Marvin, 1996; Pelling & Blackburn,
2013), where the innovation centres of the cities are often found (Mieg & Tøpfer,
2013; Denis & Zérah, 2017). We call this ICN-logic (information, communication
and network logic).
The main question in this chapter is: ‘Which factors leads to a powershift in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
In order to answer the main question we have developed three sub-questions:
Question 1: Which magnitudes are aspects of a powershift in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?
Question 2: How do new ways of working lead to a powershift in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?
Question 3: How does ICN-logic lead to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution?
Figure 4.1 summarizes this introduction and also demonstrates the ways in
which this chapter is organized.
Powershifts in the Fourth Industrial Revolution
In this section, we describe, analyse and discuss which magnitudes are aspects of
a powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Description
A new organizational logic will be developed in the Fourth Industrial Revolu-
tion, not because of a predominantly more advanced moral or ethical
approach, but because global competition has put the focus on competence,
innovation and technology (Bratianu, 2015; Abd, 2017). Individual activities
will be divided into systemic modules which will then be distributed globally
according to a cost-, quality-, innovation- and competence-based logic (Abd,
2017; Wilson, 2017). Time spent meaningfully and geographical freedom will
create the necessary preconditions for creativity and innovation (Brynjolfsson &
McAfee, 2011; Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2013). This is because people work
most creatively when time is experienced as meaningful and, when one is
free to work remotely, one will have entered organizational and senior manage-












Figure 4.1 Powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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The motives for the changes mentioned above may vary, but what we should
be aware of is the fact that the new organizational logic is not driven by
consideration of people at the frontline. Rather meaningful time, the free choice
of geographical location, and the growing demand for expertise and understand-
ing of technology linked to networks will be important resources in the new
wealth-creation processes (Noonan & Nadkarny, 2016).
The fact that morality, values and norms are put on the agenda in this process
does not soften the face of power (Chomsky, 2016a). Rather, it is only the mask of
power that changes, expressing itself in the network as a system of relationships
and positions (Chomsky, 2016b). Power assumes the mask of norms and values,
and is therefore difficult to ascertain (Armano & Murgia, 2015; Dorling, 2015).
Analysis and discussion
In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the value chain will, to a greater extent than
today, consist of the global competence network of more or less independent,
autonomous, but systemically linked, suppliers (Barrat, 2015; Case, 2016; Abd,
2017). These systemically linked suppliers will undertake various activities
depending on their expertise, technology and prevailing cost structures in the
geographical areas.
The social processes that are triggered, maintained and changed in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution can be understood as:
• The power of distribution of meaningful time (Chang, 2008);
• The power to organize the freedom of geographical location (Charnock &
Starosta, 2016);
• The power to distribute positions (Coates & Morrison, 2016);
• The power to include and exclude (Dickinson, 2016);
• The power to control definitions (definition power) (Evans & Schmalensee,
2016);
• The power to define models (model power) (Chomsky, 2016a, 2016b).
The dynamic networks that make up the organizational logic of the informa-
tion society are loosely connected to the various social networks, and strongly
connected to the coordination and integration functions in various networks
(Sennett, 2006, 2009; Bauman, 2011). The latter promotes information and
communication flow, and the former prevents intermingling of the private and
public spheres (Sennett, 2013).
Robotics, nano-computers and AI, as well as modular production design, enable
wealth-creation processes based on meaningful time and freedom in terms of
geographical location, i.e. remote working (Wilson, 2017; Zhao et al., 2017).
In the same way that hydropower was a localization factor for some of the first
industrial processes, and to some extent still is, information and communication
networks will have the same localizing effect in the Fourth Industrial Revolution
(Brynjolfsson & Saunders, 2013; Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014). Similar to how
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hydropower structured the organization of work processes, the new organiza-
tional logic determines new localization patterns and new wealth-creation
processes.
As mentioned above, from a polis perspective, the new technology may be
imagined as having a dual impact on wealth-creation processes. Activity will be
concentrated around city centres, where a substantial portion of knowledge
processes takes place (Abrahamson, 2004). Knowledge and service occupations
will increase the most in urban areas (Sanseverino & Sanseverino, 2017).
The powershift logic leads to a concentration of power and decentralization of
creativity and innovation processes. The powershift is concentrated in the
financial centres (Budd & Whimster, 1992; Chang, 2008; Chomsky, 2012).
Although some knowledge workers may have creative and fulfilling tasks, it
shouldn’t be assumed that this will be the case for service workers or unskilled
workers. Nor will it be the case that decision-making about what to produce,
where it should be produced, how surplus should be distributed, etc. will be
localized to the same areas that develop the creative ideas. On the contrary,
modular flexibility based on a new fragmentation of production will develop
globally (Chandraekaren et al., 2012). From such a perspective, the knowledge
economy is not significantly different from the industrial economy. The power
élite has now rather adopted a new geographical space for its activities, so the
powershift is therefore a transition from the local to the global scene and the
world has become a single market where the local has become global, with
regard to both production and consumption, with all the social, economic,
cultural and political implications that this entails (Rodrik, 2011). Decision-
making processes, power and decision-making authority still lie in the systems
of positions and relationships (Castells, 2009, 2016). An empirical review of this
concentration of power around the financial markets may be found in Budd and
Whimster (1992) and Sassen (1991).
A significant feature of the new production processes is that they have been
moved from specific locations to ‘global space’, i.e. the network takes over the
integration and coordination functions (Castells, 2009a, 2009b, 2016). Production
is modularized according to a cost, quality, innovation and competence logic. In
practice, this means that the consumer and producer are in principle directly
linked via the network. In this way, many of the intermediate functions in
wealth-creation processes are eliminated. Management and control are done via
the new technology. In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, highly trained technolo-
gists, professionals, research staff and individuals associated with the administrative
professions are separated from both production and each other. The physical and
social networks become the new coordinating elements in wealth-creation processes,
and become the principal drivers of wealth creation.
When such a separation occurs, identities are developed based on different
relationships than previously. These identities, based on the systems of relations
and positions in social networks, will take on other forms to previously, because
dependency is constantly changing. Instead of transparency and casting a critical
light on social conditions, it may be in the interests of the dominant network to
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have opaque social processes and relationships, i.e. mask them to avoid clarifica-
tion. This may be done by giving less emphasis to critical elements in the media,
and giving the public more ‘bread and circuses’. Of course, this assumes that the
media are largely owned by the dominant social networks controlling production,
distribution and sales (Castelfranchi, 2007).
In the industrial age, social inequalities were more visible, because everyone
was more or less tied to a specific geographical location. Stratification was literally
ordered along an east–west axis and the valley sides. Consumption was thus
transparent. However, in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, although consumption
is by no means less, on the contrary the differences and stratification are not visible
to the same extent, because the network spans geographical distances, so the
differences are less conspicuous. Inequalities are thus masked and visible only in
statistics (McGill, 2016). The social differences are, metaphorically speaking,
spread geographically along a global valley side, which largely follows the north–
south axis of the planet, and to some extent also the east–west axis, with some
exceptions (Henderson, 1989, 1990; Roat, 2016). This development started in the
USA in the 1960s, and in Japan in the 1980s, says Castells (1989, 2016).
Figure 4.2 summarizes the power shifts in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Sub-conclusion
In this section we answered the question: ‘Which magnitudes are aspects of
powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ The short answer is the five
magnitudes shown in Figure 4.2.
The power of distribution
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Figure 4.2 Powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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Theoretical and practical implications
The logic of capital in today’s global world is such that everyone who invests
their small savings helps to reinforce the urbanization processes. Consequently,
we ourselves are responsible for the social consequences that are brought about
through subtle structural couplings; paradoxically, we may later argue against
these social consequences. The same logic is obviously applicable if we put our
savings in various types of funds, or in roundabout ways borrow money from
banks that profit from investing in such funds.
The point being made here is that we cannot blame an abstract concept such as
globalization for the restructuring and the subsequent consequences that become
evident globally. It is rather a part of the genetic code of capital’s logic,
regardless of the system, to ensure the system’s survival. The logic of capital
dictates that the survival of the total system takes precedence over the sub-
system’s survival; thus parts of the system often need to be laid waste for a
period of time to achieve this. The total system thus ‘cannibalizes’ part of itself
in order to survive and eventually improve its condition. The alternative to such
cannibalization and creative destruction may be ‘constant infection’, to borrow a
metaphor from medicine. If your body is constantly infected you will sooner or
later be drained of energy, creativity and enthusiasm, and finally become
completely dependent on others.
Globalization, strong structural connections, flexibility and the focus on
costs drive economies towards urbanization, which in turn leads to production
chains being broken up into modular flexible systems with an extreme
customer focus. This leads to individual businesses orienting themselves
towards the frontline, i.e. those businesses know what the customer wants
and know how they can change production and service to increase customer
satisfaction, and thus survive in a fierce, turbo economy, which is globalized
and thus disconnected from local norms and values. Viewed from an organiza-
tional perspective in individual organizations or networks of businesses, the
strategy is thus modular flexibility and a frontline focus. It is these two
elements that can affect the wealth creation processes in individual businesses
in the most creative way, and result in the survival of social systems in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution.
New ways of working
In this section we describe, analyse and discuss the question: ‘How do new ways
of working lead to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Description
When new ways of organizing work emerge, and robots take over many of the
functions previously performed by middle-class workers, the administrative/
bureaucratic system will no longer enjoy the same legitimacy. None the less, it
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will continue to have great power (Avent, 2016). It is at this point of conflict that
tensions may emerge (Barrat, 2015). When the work is no longer organized
around the production of goods, but around the production of knowledge, new
systems of governance will develop, and accordingly the legitimacy of the
administrative/bureaucratic stratum will diminish (Bennis et al., 2012).
The fear of losing control over one’s own life is an essential part of what we
experience in the new workplace (Bolanski & Chiapello, 2017). The economic
crisis that began in 2008 accelerated these concerns among many workers
(Sennett, 2013). Therefore, willingness to change, be flexible and re-educate has
become a constant factor for many workers (Ali, 2015). Part of the fear is also
related to the fact that people’s ethical values have become relative, i.e. they vary
in relation to the external relationships they happen to have at any one time
(Furnham, 1997; Pink, 2001). Among other things, this is related to an increasing
tendency to change jobs more frequently; hence, lasting relationships are fewer
and people’s knowledge-base is changing more quickly than before (Standing,
2014a). Consequently, the time perspective is shifting from long term and stable
to short term and temporary (Savage, 2015). Temporary jobs, whether on
projects, contracts, part-time, as ‘the company of one’, etc., change the way
people relate to others (Sennett, 2013; Sanseverino & Sanseverino, 2017). An
indication of this development is the growth in employment agencies (Champy,
1995: 119; Standing, 2014b).
The fact that capital has changed character from being long term and patient to
short term and impatient may provide one explanation of these temporary work-
ing relationships (Doeringer, 1991; Piketty, 2014). The short-term and impatient
capital leads to a need for other, more easily soluble forms of organization. This
may also partly explain the transition from hierarchical structures with their
routines, bureaucracy with clear rules and greater predictability, to networks,
where structures are often reconfigured very quickly (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009;
Rothkopf, 2012). However, although the new organizational logic may be partly
explained by the new capital logic, it is made possible through the new technology.
Analysis and discussion
The willingness to change that leads to personal success will also correspond to
the erosion of values, such as loyalty, trust, commitment, responsibility for
others, etc. (Armstrong, 2014a, 2014b). In such a situation, these values may
well be conserved as ‘nostalgic’ values from another time. On the other hand, it
may well be that these values are given a second renaissance in small, tightly
packed, social networks, whereas in looser, larger systems they will be given less
emphasis (Sennett, 2006, 2009). If this happens, there is much to suggest that
larger companies will feel compelled to reintroduce elements of the management
and control measures associated with the early days of ‘scientific management’
(Srinivasa, 2017). However, in its consequences, such a development would only
reinforce the collapse of close ties in organizations and de-emphasize loyalty,
trust and responsibility for others (Bauman, 2011, 2013; Sennett, 2013).
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Hyper-change and a high degree of flexibility lead to other types of control
mechanisms coming into operation. The system of relationships and the networks of
which they form a part becomes the essential control mechanisms, not the organiza-
tional hierarchy or bureaucratic regulatory management (Bennis et al., 2012). To
achieve the desired flexibility most businesses will have to focus on their core
activities, i.e. ‘What is the system designed to do?’ will become a key issue in the
Fourth Industrial Revolution (Johannessen, 2016: 56). Thus, activities that are not
directly focused on core activities will be given less emphasis or wound down. This
will also result in hierarchical and bureaucratic control mechanisms being given less
emphasis (Bratianu, 2015). This development could, however, easily lead to those
who remain in the business developing dysfunctional behaviour, because they will
be preparing to be the next to be ‘put out in the woods to die’, i.e. fall victim to
cutbacks, etc. One may name this tendency the ‘survival syndrome’.
It may often be the case, therefore, that survivors strategically position
themselves in relation to such an expected future situation. This could become a
self-fulfilling prophecy, because motivation and morale might conflict with
management’s expectations (Sennett, 2006). Such dysfunctional behaviour can
also lead to negative consequences for production and productivity, which has
been indicated by Applebaum and Batt (1993: 23) and Harrison (1994), as well
as Harvey (2010) and Hlupic (2014).
Individual solutions will in turn promote the search for new identities, not
what we stand for but rather what we represent. Demarcation from others will
become more important when individual solutions win greater inroads, i.e.
selling your individuality in a market. In such a world, how one presents oneself
will become even more important, and we will see more people examining their
mirrored reflections in an attempt to achieve ‘the perfect’ – in such a culture
narcissism will have good days (Malkin, 2016). This may lead to greater respect
being demanded for what one stands for, precisely because it is directly linked to
one’s survival in an increasingly competitive market. However, when assess-
ments are not objective, it will be the one who can present their own subjective
view effectively who prevails.
In this development, one can imagine that demonstrating solidarity with a
particular class or strata of the population will be of lesser importance, precisely
because one’s own individuality and intellectual capital become an input factor in
the market, regardless of affiliation.
There are many objections to such thinking. One is related to the large growth
in service workers who sell their labour in a similar way to the industrial worker.
Conversely, the industrial worker is better organized than the service worker, at
least at present (Innerarity, 2012; Jemielniak, 2012). The low levels of organiza-
tion will make it easier for employers to exploit negotiation advantages. The
same may also be the case with the knowledge workers. Unless they hold critical
key positions or cannot easily be replaced by other knowledge workers or robots,
they will suffer the same fate as the service workers. The lack of organization of
the knowledge workers may be used as a bargaining chip by employers in
negotiations (Jiang et al., 2012).
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Speed, flexibility and individual solutions also mean that mobility will
increase, both within the individual’s job situation and geographically (Hage &
Powers, 1992; Godard, 2010). One consequence of this is that job insecurity for
the individual will increase, which will affect the survival syndrome.
It may also be the case that in the Fourth Industrial Revolution risk-takers will
have greater opportunities than those who are risk-averse (Mason, 2015; Meister
& Mulcahy, 2017). The motivation and objective of risk-takers largely represent a
kind of Eldorado: few get there, but those who do testify to the others about the
possibilities and glory of being a risk-taker. It is therefore reasonable to assume
that it is among the risk-takers that one will find the winners in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Dickinson, 2016; Evans & Schmalensee, 2016). Simulta-
neously, this risk culture will drive forward greater inequality than we have so far
seen in European welfare economies (Piketty, 2014; McGill, 2016).
When mobility increases, personal relationships are exposed to stress, which
can easily result in Teflon relationships developing. The psychological contracts
in which closeness and depth play a large role may be replaced by ephemeral
and superficial relationships, in which functional solidarity becomes normal, i.e.
solidarity is shown only to the extent it is useful to oneself (Sennett, 2006, 2013).
The superficial character of personal relationships will make it easier for
individuals to create their own life story, because social ties will not hold a person
back. Weak ties will thus be a strength for mobility both career-wise and geographi-
cally. One weakness of this strength is that the employee may find himself in a
communicative vacuum. This means that the communication network that is the
strength of close relationships will be eroded, and one will find oneself in the core of
a communicative cyclone where tranquillity prevails (Sennett, 2013). A counter-
strategy for the mobile nomad will be to be affiliated to a professional community,
which ensures knowledge sharing that the communication network aims to maintain.
Another strategy will be to actively use the new ICT to maintain personal relation-
ships so that the communication network is kept intact. The point of this is that
communication can, from a relational perspective, be more important than what is
actually communicated. This means that communication as a symbolic act can have
greater significance than the semantic content of communication.
Figure 4.3 summarizes how new ways of working will lead to a powershift in
the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
Sub-conclusion
In this section we have answered the question: ‘How do new ways of working
lead to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’ The short answer is the
six factors in Figure 4.3.
Theoretical and practical implications
If network organization leads to short-sightedness in human relationships, then
the obligation, commitment, trust and loyalty one has towards the organization
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where one works will be transferred to one’s self. This will enhance egocentrism
and result in greater individualization. Such a development would lead to a
fragmentation of social relationships. The superficial relationships we have indi-
cated here may well prove to be a necessary condition for organizational flexibility.
It is reasonable to think that less emphasis on relationships based on trust, binding
commitment and loyalty will lead to more emphasis being placed on individuals
taking responsibility for themselves. This will strengthen mobility, flexibility,
narcissism, Teflon relationships, functional solidarity and the willingness to
change. On the other hand, collective ties and norms will be emphasized less.
The personal crises resulting from such a transition to a new work logic will
lead to individual solutions that will change values and basic norms in the work-
place. Cuts, elimination of functions and departments that are moved to other
entities, concentration on core processes and robots taking over functions will lead
to increased turbulence, less emphasis on collective solutions and thus a greater
emphasis on individual solutions. The acceptance of personal initiatives and indivi-
dual solutions as a strategy for success, in contrast to the work collective, may
appear to be a significant change in the basic norms of the workplace. Rapid changes
in working life will be accepted as if they were natural laws, which are, per
definition, something you adhere to. Uncertainty has become the norm and security
nostalgia. It is in this situation that the free agent, contract worker, project worker,
‘the company of one’, the precariat and working for several employers will become
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Figure 4.3 New ways of working leading to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial
Revolution.
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A natural consequence of this development will be changes to basic norms and
ethical attitudes. At least this will apply to utility or practical ethics, if not the
ethical values one pronounces verbally. However, practical ethical values will
eventually become so different from the outspoken ones that the latter will
gradually be modified to accommodate the discrepancy in order to mitigate
psychological tension.
ICN-logic
In this section, we describe, analyse and discuss the question: ‘How does ICN-logic
lead to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?’
Description
ICN-logic is driven by globalization, the new technology, innovation and culture
(Certomá et al., 2017). The new forms of technology, robots, informats and AI
will lead to new methods of production, distribution and consumption, which
will in turn affect how work is organized (Abd, 2017; Zhao et al., 2017). How
technology drives value creation has been demonstrated many times in recent
research, e.g. Schwab (2016), Brynjolfsson & McAfee (2014) and Bleuer et al.
(2017), to name just a few.
A consequence of the new technology is an even greater focus on commu-
nication as the foundation stone of organization and management (Wilson, 2017).
Already in 1969, Karl E. Weick said that it is precisely communication that is the
foundation stone of organization (Weick, 1979: 35). How we communicate, with
whom, through what channels and with what effect are therefore entirely central
to organizational logic. All communication takes place with the help of some
form of symbols, which can be expressed by cave paintings or by electronic
messages. Communication is understood as a reciprocal stream of messages in a
network (Bateson, 1972: 399–410).
A message consists of three components: first, the information component is
the message’s core; second, it consists of a relational component, which
concerns how to understand, interpret and perceive a message, and depends
on the relationship you have with the sender, e.g. if the message were from
one’s wife, one would interpret it in one way, whereas, if it came from the tax
authorities one would orient the interpretation on another frequency; and,
third, the message is composed of a hierarchical component, which can have
implications for interpretation, e.g. in a military context, one would interpret a
message differently depending on whether it came from an equal, such as say
Private Brown, or a superior, such as a colonel. All three components of a
message are placed in a context that sends context markers to the receiver,
who then interprets the message on the basis of this context. An essential point
related to the organization of the message is how one is integrated into the
communication processes that take place in the context or network of which
one is a part.
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Another point is whether you are the acting or reacting party in the network. If
you are not integrated into the communication processes then you are outside the
new organizational logic, because it is this ICN-logic that prevails in the new
wealth-creation processes. If you do not have the opportunity to be the acting
party in a network or system, then there are others who act on your behalf.
However, this may be disadvantageous, because the motives of others need not
be congruent with your own. The new emphasis on communication, through
ICN-logic and network thinking, is an important driving force behind the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Schwab, 2016).
Analysis and discussion
The new technology connected to ICN-logic results in what may seem to be a
paradoxical consequence. The paradox is that all assumptions point in the direction
that people should be able to live a comfortable life in their familiar surroundings
at any locality around the world using the new technology (Catmull, 2014).
However, developments seem to point to the opposite tendency. People are
moving to urban areas like never before, and especially to core centres in urban
areas (Barrat, 2015). It would seem that communication promotes communication
within the context of a polis logic (Sassen, 2002; Case, 2016).
‘Polis logic’ is of course as old as the concept is, about 2500 years old. In
polis logic, people are concerned about the development in central urban areas.
Also there is the polis logic that develops agora, i.e. meeting places in the polis
where communication and innovation may be developed. Agora is driven by the
need to create relationships and to participate in the stories that prevail in the
network in question, and thus be part of the creative development of the Fourth
Industrial Revolution (Catmull, 2014; Gupta et al., 2016).
Communication may then conceivably be imagined as taking place between
the agoras in the various urban centres of various polises, such as Paris, London,
New York and Tokyo. It may be said that these are more interconnected than the
respective agoras are to the surrounding areas of these global cities. In this way, a
stream of messages is developed, where technology, innovation and knowledge are
created and disseminated. In the Fourth Industrial Revolution, this also creates
‘backwaters’, which are left behind during economic growth and wealth creation.
Agoras are the meeting places in the various polises where global, multi-
cultural, private and public spaces meet, coordinate and integrate. In other words,
the parts are woven together into a whole and a common meaning is generated
precisely in these agora areas of the various polises. The size of the polis is not
the defining characteristic of its existence. It is the system of relations (economic,
political, cultural and social), both internally in the polis and between the polises,
that characterizes the existence of the various agoras and polises.
For instance, the system of relations in polis and agora may be expressed as:
• Control over the media;
• Control of the formation of meaning;
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• Control of the political agenda;
• Control over economic structures and processes;
• Control over political structures and processes;
• Control over cultural structures and processes.
Polis logic may easily result in isolating the population in rural areas, so
they are symbolically excluded from the formation of meaning. They will be
put in a position of reacting rather than acting in communication networks.
This may eventually lead to a conflict among the polises, agoras and rural
areas.
Polis logic will be at the centre of the cultural, economic, political, technolo-
gical and social dynamics in the Fourth Industrial Revolution (Brynjolfsson and
McAfee, 2011; Jemielniak, 2014). The polises and agoras will therefore act as
magnets for the surrounding areas and further enhance this development. An
indicator of how an area will evolve in relation to technology, innovation and
knowledge may be related to the development of the polises and agoras in the
geographical areas of interest for analysis.
At the global level, it is the large cities and metropolises that dominate
knowledge development and supply knowledge to the private sector
(Case, 2016; Bleuer et al., 2017). Polis logic displays another interesting
phenomenon, namely that the ties between the various polises, e.g. urban
areas in the EU, become stronger, whereas the ties between town and country
become weaker. This has been shown to be the case in the EU by Cappelin
(1991), and is mentioned by Case (2016) and Brynjolfsson and Saunders
(2013).
Within the various levels of the network, i.e. the global, regional and national,
this hierarchical logic of polises, agoras and rural areas will become clearer
(Castells, 1989: 385; Dickinson, 2016). At the national level, this means that the
various polises will become more important, whereas the opportunities in rural
areas will largely depend on their connection to the polis areas, nationally,
regionally or even to the global metropolises.
Metropolitan areas dominate in the field of knowledge development and the
supply of knowledge to businesses (Sassen, 1991; Budd & Whimster, 1992; Rosa
& Mathys-Treio, 2015). As mentioned above, metropolitan logistics display
another interesting phenomenon, namely that the links between various large
cities, e.g. metropolitan areas within the EU, become stronger and the relative
links between ‘town and country’ become weaker. This has been demonstrated in
the case of the EU by Cappelin (1991). These kinds of logistics will become ever
more apparent in global, regional and national networks (Castells, 1989: 385;
Catmull, 2014). At a national level, this will mean that the various metropolitan
areas will gain increased significance, whereas opportunities for rural areas will
to a large extent lie in forming connections with metropolitan areas, both
nationally and regionally.
Figure 4.4 summarizes how ICN-logic will lead to a powershift in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution in.
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Sub-conclusion
In this section we have answered the question: ‘How does ICN-logic lead to a
powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution? The short answer is that three
magnitudes lead to the powershift initiated by ICN-logic: polis, agora and rural logic.
Theoretical and practical implications
Bypassing the national polices may be a very effective knowledge strategy for
several of the smaller knowledge centres within a country. The rationale here
relates to the historical mental models that often create psychological barriers in
local areas. The ‘left behind’ psychology will always exist as a social obstacle, at
least at the mental level in the system of relationships that constitutes a nation. It
is only through network connections that the rural areas can be other than
recreational areas for ‘communication-tired’ polis residents. In light of this
understanding, one can delineate certain features of the Fourth Industrial Revolu-
tion’s polis, agora and rural logic:
• Concentration of power in specific centres in the network;
• Increasing control over critical information and communication, and less
control of information and communication that is not critical for the exercise
of power;
• Stronger market specialization in certain systems, but also greater diversity in
















Figure 4.4 ICT-logic leading to a powershift in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
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• The simultaneous existence of regulation and deregulation of barriers to
trade, information, communication, labour, capital and knowledge processes;
• Increasing flexibility at all stages and levels in the various networks;
• Polis domination, economically, culturally, politically and relationally;
• The rural areas’ resurgence as information mediators, e.g. in design, devel-
opment of information products, suppliers of information and knowledge
products;
• The production of goods and services will follow an extreme cost, quality
and competence logic;
• The global dominance of the metropolises regarding management and control
of trade and banking, as well as financial services.
Conclusion
The main question was: ‘Which factors lead to a powershift in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution?’ The short answer is that six factors in the new ways of
working, and three factors in the ICN-logic lead to a powershift in the Fourth
Industrial Revolution.
Theoretical and practical implications
The urban areas, i.e. the various polises, will largely provide the framework for
career development for young people. This will lead to new professions and
career paths, which did not exist in the industrial era, becoming new high status
occupations.
Educational level and knowledge will be important as a symbolic demarcation
mechanism in the Fourth Industrial Revolution. In such a context, it seems
reasonable that continuous skills development will be a factor that determines
whether young people choose one career path over another. The expertise
increasingly demanded by the knowledge society will occur in the polis areas.
This implies a further concentration around the polis areas in the various regions.
The rural areas will become sub-suppliers of services and information to the
polis areas, and centres of service and information processes will be developed.
Where these centres are located will be of less importance; however, the choice
of location will be subject to an extreme cost, quality, innovation and compe-
tence logic. To a large extent, competition will increase between the various rural
areas of each country, and there will thus be as much tension between the rural
areas as between the centre and periphery. Consequently, centralization and
decentralization will exist simultaneously in a dynamic interplay in which speed
and flexibility will be key elements.
The various systems of relationships and positions will constitute the net-
works’ centres, where decisions are taken. However, these centres will not
necessarily be geographically located. Power may be viewed as a process of
the system of relationships that are developed in relation to certain activities
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and processes to perform specific tasks. Thus, the system of decision-making
in the central networks will constitute the centres of power, not geographical
locations.
Polis logic is largely driven by the social mechanisms that promote the
development of innovative environments. These environments develop and
transfer new knowledge between systems and integrate this knowledge in such
a way that it becomes workable for creating new products and/or processes. Polis
logic is totally dependent on physical proximity in the agora to promote the
development of such environments.
Technopoles may exist as separate geographical units within the polis, and
have their own agora. Such key technopoles have emerged globally: Singapore,
Paris–south, London–M4 corridor, Milan, Moscow–Zelenograd, Boston Route
128, Silicon Valley, Seattle, etc. However, a technopolis is just one type of
polis; there are also other types of polises and their agora related to the areas
of economics, culture and politics. Polis logic presupposes a concentration of
a large number of individuals who have similar mindsets. It is also related to
a high degree of risk-taking. However, when risks are taken in the polis, if
one is unsuccessful, the polis still provides many new opportunities for
finding a new project or job, so risk-taking will not be hampered by the fear
of failure. Thus, the polis provides a protective framework around risk-taking,
resulting in a willingness to change and a high degree of innovation, which
will be the hallmark of the polis. Innovation, spin-offs and creativity will
characterize polis areas. In turn, this will reinforce the influx into these areas,
because they will have a magnetic effect on young people and knowledge
workers.
The simultaneous existence of stability and change will also become a hall-
mark of polis areas. In the polis environments that have already been established,
as mentioned above, we see a lot of job changing. There will emerge a
distinction between jobs that change and work that continues. To be out of a
job is not so bad, as long as one has work to do.
The distinction between jobs and work increases the dynamics of the polis
areas. Despite changing jobs, people will still be able to work with a project as
an entrepreneur, etc. It’s only the address of the office that changes, when there is
a shift between jobs and work.
Polis logic is not driven separately by local or global dynamics, but is a
fusion of global and local thinking, embodied in a modular network logic that
enables a global environment to develop in the local polises. The dynamics
between the various polises is essential for maintaining a high degree of
innovation in the individual polises. The concentration of people in the polis,
and the simultaneous multicultural synthesis created in the meeting between
polises worldwide, the global part of the polis logic, will maintain innovation
opportunities in the local polises. This may be said to be the global variation
of the strength of weak ties, and the explanation of the distinction between
jobs and work. Jobs change extremely in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, but
work is continuous.
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Note
1 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Megacity, more than 10 million people.
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5 Concepts
Ambidextrous organizations
Ambidextrous organizations are organizations that have the ability to adapt to
changes in external conditions while at the same time generating their own
future by means of, among other things, performance improvement, growth and
innovation (Duncan, 1976; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004, 2006, 2011; Thota &
Munir, 2011).
In 2004, O’Reilly and Tushman expressed that ambidextrous organizations
would constitute one of the major challenges for management in the global
knowledge economy.
The findings of O’Reilly and Tushman (2004) were overwhelming. With regard
to the launching of radical innovations, they found that none of the cross-functional
or unsupported teams, and only a quarter of the teams with functional designs,
could produce radical innovations, whereas, among the ambidextrous organizations,
90 per cent were successful in producing radical innovations. Empirical research
has shown that this type of organizational design is best for producing both
incremental and radical innovations (Thota & Munir, 2011).
Asplund’s motivation theory1
In brief, this theory can be described in the following way: ‘People are motivated
by social responses’ (Asplund, 2010: 221–229). The following statement may be
said to be a central point made by Asplund’s theory: ‘When people receive social
responses, their level of activity increases.’
Asplund’s motivation theory is consistent with North’s action theory (see
North’s action theory). Understood in this way, it seems reasonable to connect
the two theories in the statement: ‘People are motivated by the social responses
rewarded by the institutional framework.’
Availability cascades
This refers to the idea that we are all controlled by the image of reality created
by the media, because this image is easy to retrieve from memory.
Availability proposition
This may be expressed as follow: the more easily information enters our
consciousness, the greater the likelihood that we will have confidence in that
information. In other words, we believe more in the type of information that is
available in memory than information that is not so readily available.
Behavioural perspective
This perspective focuses on the behaviour of employees as an explanation for the
relationship between business strategy and the results obtained.
Boudon–Coleman diagram
This research methodology was developed by Mario Bunge (1979: 76–79)
based on insights made by the sociologists Boudon and Coleman. The
purpose of the diagram is to show the relationship between the various
levels, such as the macro- and micro-levels. For instance, it is shown how
changes at the macro-level, such as technological innovations in feudal
society, can lead to increased income at the micro-level. However, it was
shown that technological innovations could lead to weakening of the semi-
feudal structures because dependency on landowners was reduced. Conse-
quently, the landowners opposed such changes, especially in the case of
technological innovations, which Boudon has shown in his research
(Boudon, 1981: 100). Coleman (Coleman, 1990: 7–12) started at the macro-
level, went to the individual level to find explanations and finally ended up at
the macro-level again.
An important purpose of Bunge’s Boudon–Coleman diagram is to identify
social mechanisms that maintain or change the phenomenon or problem under
investigation (as mentioned above, in Boudon’s analysis of semi-feudal society).
Bunge’s Boudon–Coleman diagram may be said to represent a ‘mixed strategy’;
Bunge says the following:
When studying systems of any kind a) reduce them to their components
(at some level) and the interaction among these, as well as among
them and environmental items, but acknowledge and explain emergence
(see the chapter on concepts) whenever it occurs, and b) approach
systems from all pertinent sides and on all relevant levels, integrating
theories or even research fields whenever unidisciplinarity proves to be
insufficient.
(Bunge, 1998: 78).
The purpose of this research strategy is to arrive at a deeper and more
complete explanation of a system’s behaviour.
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Capabilities
Capabilities for an organization are what abilities are for an individual. An organiza-
tional capability may thus be defined as an organization’s ability to perform a task,
activity or process. Operational capabilities enable an organization to make money
in the here and now (Winter, 2003: 991–995). Dynamic capabilities, as opposed to
operational capabilities, are linked to processes of change. Change and innovation
are at the centre of dynamic capabilities.
Simplified, one may say that organizational capabilities are something an
organization does well compared with its competitors (Ulrich & Brockbank,
2005). These capabilities are intangible and therefore difficult for competitors to
imitate (Wernerfelt, 1984).
Cohesive energy
In a social system cohesive energy is ‘the glue’ that binds the system together.
Cohesive energy is the social mechanisms that make the system durable. According
to systemic thinking it is the relationships and actions that bind social systems
together. The rationale is that relationships and systems of relationships may be said
to control human behaviour. Social systems are held together (in systemic thinking)
by dynamic social relationships (e.g. feelings, perceptions, norms) and social action
(e.g. cooperation, solidarity, conflict and communication).
Co-creation
Co-creation involves working together to promote knowledge processes and
innovation. If knowledge processes and innovation are essential for value crea-
tion in the knowledge society, co-creation is an important social mechanism for
initiating, maintaining and strengthening these processes. The balance between
competition and cooperation, embodied in the concept of co-creation, leads to
constructive criticism and the necessary scope of knowledge that exists in the
network so as to promote creativity and innovation. Instead of a zero-sum
situation, a positive-sum situation will be developed in which everyone wins.
Collective blindness
Collective blindness may be said to be a form of collective arrogance, which
results in irrational actions. Minor events slip under the radar, causing the system
not to be fully aware of what is happening. Politicians’ explanations of why
voters in a referendum vote contrary to what most of the power élite and the
media advocated is an example of collective blindness.
Competence
Competence refers to knowledge, skills and attitudes.
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Core competence
The concept was popular in the strategy literature of the 1990s. Core
competence may be defined as: ‘a bundle of skills and technologies that
enable a company to provide a particular benefit to customers’ (Hamel &
Prahalad, 1996: 219). More recently, core competence as a concept has been
given less attention in the research on dynamic capabilities, and now there is
more focus on the concept of fitness. The term ‘evolutionary fitness’ is also
used in the research literature in connection with technology, quality, cost
development, market development, innovation and competitive positioning
(Helfat et al., 2007: 7).
Discontinuous innovations
These are innovations that change the premises of technology, markets, our
mindset, and so on. We know that sooner or later discontinuous innovations
will emerge (Hewing, 2013).
Dynamic capabilities
Dynamic capabilities stem from the resource-based perspective and evolution-
ary thinking in strategy literature (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Teece, 2013: 3–65,
82–113). The dynamic perspective attempts to explain what promotes an
organization’s competitive position over time through innovation and growth
(Teece, 2013: x).
The original thinking concerning dynamic capabilities may be related to Teece
et al. (1997), who defined dynamic capabilities as ‘an organization’s ability to
create, develop and modify its internal and external expertise in order to address
changes in the external world’.
Dynamic capabilities are now seen as all the organizational processes, not just
internal and external expertise, that contribute to an organization’s capacity to
adapt to change while creating the organization’s future.
Emergent
An emergent occurs if something new turns up on one level that has not
previously existed on the level below. With emergent we mean:
Let S be a system with composition A, i.e. the various components in
addition to the way they are composed. If P is a property of S, P is emergent
with regard to A, if and only if no components in A possess P; otherwise P




The entrepreneurial spirit may be described as follows (Roddick, 2003: 106–107):
• The vision of something new and a belief in this that is so strong that belief
becomes reality;
• A touch of positive madness;
• The ability to stand out from the crowd;
• Creative tension bubbling over;
• Pathological optimism;
• To act before you know!
• Basic desire for change;
• Creative energy focused on ideas, not on explicit factual knowledge;
• Being able to tell the story you want to sell.
Evidence
This may be results, such as research results, that can be relied on. However, it is
also important to be aware of the fact that other evidence may be available
without having to refer to figures and quantities, such as evidence that emerges
from observations and good judgement without the assessment being quantified.
Evidence-based research is research results that are based on approved and
accepted scientific research methods.
Explicit knowledge
This is knowledge that can be digitized and communicated to others as information.
Feedback
Giving the other person feedback, e.g. with regard to their behaviour, attitudes,
and the like, is the most important element in the area of interactive skills and
emotional intelligence (Goleman, 1996, 2007). Analysis of feedback is a sure
way to identify our strengths and then reinforce them (Wang et al., 2003). Failure
to give people feedback on their behaviour in some contexts may even be
considered immoral.
Feed-forward
Feed-forward is regarded here as an expectation mechanism. It seems reasonable
to assume that our expectations influence our behaviour in the present. It is
therefore important that we make explicit to ourselves the expectations we have
of a situation. By making expectations explicit, we have a greater opportunity to
learn from our experiences and thus improve our performance.
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Frontline focus
This refers to those in the frontline, i.e. in direct contact with customers, users,
patients, students, etc. They have the greatest expertise, necessary information
and decision-making authority, and are regarded as the most important resource
in the organization because they are at the point where an organization’s value
creation occurs.
Global competence network
These competence networks may be divided into political, social, economic,
technological and cultural patterns. It is when these five patterns interact that one
may perceive the overall pattern. In the global knowledge economy it seems
reasonable to assume that those who control this pattern set the conditions for
economic development. These global competence networks will most likely
make an impact on human resource (HR) departments in companies competing
for this kind of expertise in national markets.
Global competence networks are also emphasized as crucial for economic
growth by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD, 2001), although they use the term ‘innovative clusters’. The purpose
of innovative clusters and global competence networks is the development,
dissemination and use of new ideas that promote wealth creation.
There is much to suggest that a greater degree of integration and cooperation
between private and public sectors, at national and regional levels, is an
important prerequisite for initiating the innovative locomotive effect. The
global competence networks are metaphorically the energy source that sus-
tains the motion of this locomotive. It would be counterproductive to replace
the locomotive once in motion. Conversely, the individual carriages of the
locomotive (read: organizational level) can be changed depending on their
competitive position. The individual passengers on the train create ideas and
knowledge through the processes that may be called creative chaos. In this
way we will arrive at the three prerequisites for global competence networks:
at the individual level, creative chaos occurs; at the organizational level, there
will be creative destruction; and at the social and global levels, creative
collaboration takes place. These three processes create innovation and eco-
nomic growth as an emergent, not a future perfectum, i.e. a planned process
with given results.
A prerequisite for the reasoning above is that tension and competition at
one level require collaboration at another level. Competition and cooperation
are both necessary if one is to develop innovation and economic growth,
in the same manner that stability and change are necessary for flexibility.
Too much of the one (stability) leads to rigidity, and too much of the other
(change) leads to chaos. Understood in this way, emergents cannot be
planned.
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Hamel’s law of innovation
The ‘law’ states that only between one and two of a thousand ideas become
innovations in a market (Hamel, 2002, 2012). Therefore, an infostructure must be
created to ensure that ideas are continuously produced in a business.
Hidden knowledge
Hidden knowledge is what we do not know we do not know. Kirzner (1982) says
that hidden knowledge is possibly the most important knowledge domain of
creativity, innovation and entrepreneurship.
History’s ‘slow fields’
This refers to the fact that norms, values and actions tend to be in operation long
after the functions, activities and processes that initially created them disappear,
thus generating so-called slow fields of history. These norms, values and actions
exist although they have no apparent function, contributing to maintaining a type
of behaviour long after the type of behaviour is functional or meaningful.2 For
sociologists and historians it is important to determine whether norms and values
have any function, or whether they are part of history’s slow fields. By examin-
ing history’s slow fields, it may be possible to provide better explanations for
phenomena.
HR management
HR management is defined as HR practices at various levels (micro, meso,
macro) for managing people in organizations.
HR management has been defined in many different ways, e.g. Boxall &
Purcell (2003: 1) define HR management as all those activities oriented towards
managing relationships between employees in an organization. This definition
emphasizes the relational perspective. Later, they expanded their definition to
include all the activities and processes that underpin an organization’s value
creation (Boxall & Purcell, 2010: 29). On this basis, Armstrong defines the
activities and processes that HR management should engage in:
HRM covers activities such as human capital management, knowledge
management, organizational design and development, resource planning
(recruitment, talent development), performance management, organizational
learning, reward systems, relationships between employees, and employees’
wellness.
(Armstrong, 2014: 6).
However, we believe Armstrong underestimates two essential areas of knowl-
edge in his definition: the management of innovation processes, and change
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processes in organizations. Innovation and change are strongly emphasized in the
global HR management survey (White & Younger, 2013: 35–39). Armstrong has
included the ethical perspective in his Handbook for Human Resources Manage-
ment (Armstrong, 2014a: 95–105). Management of innovation processes and
change processes in organizations is also highlighted and underlined by Wright
et al. (2011: 5) in their description of HR management. However, it must also be
said that Armstrong discusses innovation (Armstrong, 2014: 145–155), but not in
his process definition of HR management. Innovation and change processes are
also emphasized by Ulrich et al. (2013). Brockbank (2013: 24) in particular
mentions these two processes as being important in the research model that
Ulrich et al. (2013) have developed through 25 years of their empirical research.
Implicit knowledge
This is knowledge that is spread throughout an organization but not integrated.
Informats
By informats, we mean robots with artificial intelligence (AI) that are intercon-
nected in a global technological network. Figuratively, informats may be ima-
gined as clusters of neurons in the human brain, which are connected to other
neuron clusters to create the various functions of human intelligence (Winfield,
2012; Wilson, 2017; Vadakkepat & Goswami, 2018). In the financial world, the
use of robots by financial analysts provides an example of the use of so-called
informats. Informats for use in medical surgery are already on the drawing board
and will be a reality in the near future (Bleuer et al., 2017); the same applies to
the use of informats in the service and education sectors (Bleuer & Bouri, 2017).
Informats are understood here in the context of the above description as being
emergents3 in relation to robots; informats can sense, analyse and reach decisions
in the space of a micro-second.
Information input overload
This occurs when an individual, a team, an organization or a community receives
more information than they can manage to process.
In a situation characterized by information input overload, the following may
occur (Miller, 1978: 123):
1. Designated tasks and responsibilities are left undone;
2. Errors are made;
3. Queues of information occur;
4. Information is filtered out that should have been included;
5. Abstract formulations are made when they should have been specific;
6. Communication channels are overloaded, creating stress and tension in the
system;
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7. Complex situations are shunned;
8. Information is lumped together for processing.
Each of the above eight points may result in a decrease in efficiency when the
system is exposed to information input overload.
Infostructure
The infostructure concerns the processes that enable the development, transfer,
analysis, storage, coordination and management of data, information and knowledge.
The infostructure consists of eleven generic processes, which may be considered as
nodes in a social network at different levels, e.g. team, organization, society and
region, all in the global space. Together, the eleven processes comprise the totality of
the infostructure.
It may be said that the infostructure has the same importance in the knowledge
society as the infrastructure had in the industrial society.
Innovation
Innovation is here understood as any idea, practice or material element that is
perceived as new to the person using it (Zaltman et al., 1973).
Ideas are seen as the smallest unit in the innovation process (Hamel, 2002,
2012). However, this refers to the ideas that are in the development process
rather than fully developed ideas. Before an idea can be characterized as
innovative, it must prove beneficial to somebody, i.e. the market must accept
the idea and apply it. Consequently, the creative process of innovation is here
understood as the benefit it has for a market (Amabile, 1990; Johannessen et al.,
2001: 25). Thus, it is not sufficient for an idea to be new for it to be considered
an innovation. An idea may have a great degree of novelty, but, if it is of no
benefit to anybody in the market, then it has no innovative value.
Kaizen
This is a Japanese method, which means that an organization develops systems
for organized improvement (Maurer, 2012).
Knowledge
The definition of knowledge used here is the systematization and structuring of
information for one or more goals or purposes.
Knowledge worker
A knowledge worker has been described by the OECD as a person whose
primary task is to generate and apply knowledge, rather than to provide services
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or produce physical products (OECD, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e,
2001). This may be understood as a formal definition of a knowledge worker.
This definition does not restrict knowledge workers to creative fields, as is the
case with, for example, the work of Mosco and McKercher (2007: vii–xxiv). The
OECD definition also allows for the fact that a knowledge worker may perform
routine tasks, but does not limit the type of work performed by knowledge
workers to tasks relating to creative problem-solving strategies, unlike the
definition provided by Reinhardt et al. (2011).
Knowledge enterprise
This is an enterprise that has knowledge as its most significant output. It is
perhaps helpful to think of the process input–process–output to separate indus-
trial enterprises from knowledge enterprises. A great deal of knowledge and
skills are needed to produce high-tech products such as computers, and there are
also many knowledge workers involved in this process. However, most of the
products produced today are high-tech industrial products and, although such
products require very skilled knowledge in the production process, they are
nevertheless output–industrial products.
On the other hand, law firms, consulting firms and universities are examples of
knowledge enterprises.
Knowledge management
This is management of knowledge resources in an organization. These resources may
be explicit knowledge, implicit knowledge, tacit knowledge or hidden knowledge.
Locomotive effect
This refers to something that generates and then reinforces an activity or
development.
Modularization
An extreme fragmentation of the production process in the global knowledge
economy. Production is fragmented and distributed according to the following
logic: costs–quality–competence–design–innovation.
Modular flexibility
This is the modulization of value creation. Modular flexibility may best be
understood as the globalization of production processes, and extreme specializa-
tion of work processes with a focus on core processes.
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Necessary and sufficient conditions
It may often be appropriate to divide conditions or premises into necessary
conditions and sufficient conditions. Necessary conditions must be present to
trigger an action, but these may not be sufficient. The sufficient conditions must
also be present to trigger the action.
North’s action theory4
This action theory may be expressed in the following statement: ‘People act on
the basis of a system of rewards as expressed in the norms, values, rules and
attitudes in the culture (the institutional framework)’ (North, 1990, 1993).
North’s action theory is also consistent with Asplund’s motivation theory (see
Asplund’s motivation theory).
Primary task
An organization’s primary task is what the system is designed to do.
Proposition
This is an overarching hypothesis. It says something about the interrelationship
of several variables. A proposition relates to a hypothesis in the same way the
main research problem relates to research questions.
Punctuation
By punctuation (Bateson, 1972: 292–293) a distinction is drawn between
cause and effect; this is done with a clear motive in mind. A causality is
thus created, which does not actually exist in the real world, and one is then
free to discuss the effects of this cause which has been created through a
process of punctuation.
A sequence of a process is selected, and then bracketed. In this way, we de-
limit what is punctuated from the rest of the process. Figuratively, we may
imagine this as a circle that is divided into small pieces; one piece of the circle is
then selected and unfolded into a straight line. This results in the creation of an
artificial beginning and end. This beginning and end of course cannot exist in a
circle, but only through the process of punctuation.
Social laws
Social laws constitute a pattern of a unique type. They are systemic and connected
to a system of knowledge, and cannot change without the facts they represent also
being changed (Bunge, 1983a, 1983b). The main differences between a statement
of a law and other statements are:
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1. Law statements are general;
2. Law statements are systemic, i.e. they are related to the established system of
knowledge;
3. Law statements have been verified through many studies.
A pattern may be understood as variables that are stable over a specific period
of time. A social law is created when an observer gains insight into the pattern.
By gaining such insight, we can also predict parts of behaviour or at least
develop a rough estimate within a short period of time.
Social laws are further related to specific social systems, in both time and
space. However, this does not represent any objection to social laws, because this
is also true of natural laws (although these have a longer timespan and are of a
more general nature).
Social mechanism
Robert Merton (1967) brought the notion of social mechanisms into sociology,
although we can find rudiments of this in both Weber – with the Protestant ethic
as an explanation for the emergence of capitalism in Europe – and Durkheim,
who uses society as an explanation for a rising suicide rate. For Merton, social
mechanisms are the building blocks of middle range theories. He defines social
mechanisms as ‘social processes having designated consequences for designated
parts of the social structure’ (Merton, 1967: 43). In the 1980s and 1990s, Jon
Elster developed a new notion of the role of social mechanisms in sociology
(Elster, 1986, 1989). Hedstrom and Swedberg write that: ‘the advancement of
social theory calls for an analytical approach that systematically seeks to
explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed associations
between events’ (Hedstrøm & Swedberg, 1998: 1).
It is one thing to point out connections between phenomena, and something
quite different to point out satisfactory explanations for these relationships,
which is what social mechanisms accomplish. A social mechanism tells us what
will happen, how it will happen and why it will happen (Bunge, 1967). Social
mechanisms are primarily analytical constructs that cannot necessarily be
observed; in other words, they are epistemological, not ontological. However,
social mechanisms are observable in their consequences. An intention can be a
social mechanism of action. We cannot observe an intention, but we can
interpret it in the light of the consequences manifested through an action.
Preferences can also function as a social mechanism for economic behaviour.
We cannot observe a person’s preferences, but we can interpret them in the
light of the behavioural consequences that manifest themselves. Understood in
this way, social mechanisms are analytical constructs, indicating connections
between events (Hernes, 1998).
Bunge says: ‘a social mechanism is a process in a concrete system, such that it
is capable of being about or preventing some change in the system as a whole or
in some of its subsystems’ (Bunge, 1997a: 414). By ‘social mechanism’ here we
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mean those activities that promote/inhibit social processes in relation to a specific
problem/phenomenon.
Material resources and technology are social mechanisms of the economic
subsystem; power is a social mechanism of the political subsystem; fundamental
norms and values are a social mechanism of the cultural subsystem; and human
relationships are a social mechanism of the social subsystem. These system-
specific social mechanisms interact with each other to achieve certain goals,
maintain these systems or avoid certain undesirable conditions in the system or
the outside world.
The difficulty of discovering social mechanisms and distinguishing them from
processes may be partly explained by the fact that social mechanisms are also
processes (Bunge, 1997a: 414). For the application of social mechanisms, see the
Boudon–Coleman diagram.
Social system
From a systemic perspective, social systems can be conceptual or concrete.
Theories and analytical models are examples of conceptual systems. Further-
more, social systems are composed of people and their artefacts (Bunge, 1996:
21). Social systems are held together (in systemic reasoning) by dynamic
social relations (such as emotions, interpretations, norms, etc.) and social
actions (such as cooperation, solidarity, conflict and communication). None of
the social actions has precedence in the systemic interpretation of social
systems, such as conflict in the case of Marx and solidarity in the case of
Durkheim.
Staccato behaviour (erratic behaviour)
If organizations introduce too many change processes in succession too quickly,
a phenomenon may occur called ‘staccato behaviour’.
If an organization does not deal with this appropriately, it seems reasonable
to assume that workers will become tired, burnt-out and de-motivated.
Perhaps most damaging to business, employees will lose focus on their
primary task – what the business is designed to do. In addition, businesses
will often experience this leading to an increasing degree of opportunistic
behaviour (Ulrich, 2013: 260).
Strategic HR management
Strategic HR management is defined in this book as: ‘The choices an HR
department makes with regard to human resources for the purposes of achiev-
ing the organization’s goals.’ This is analogous to the view of Storey et al.
(2009: 3) and consistent with the definition we employ for HR management.
This means that strategic HR management must be focused on the micro-,
meso- and macro-levels.
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There are many definitions of strategic HR management, e.g. ‘use of human
resources in order to achieve lasting competitive advantages for the business’
(Mathis & Jackson, 2008: 36); ‘development of a consistent practices in order to
support the strategic goals of the business’ (Mello, 2006: 152); and ‘a complex
system with the following characteristics: vertical integration, horizontal integra-
tion, efficiency, partnership’ (Schuler & Jackson, 2005).
Systemic thinking
Systemic thinking distinguishes the epistemological sphere (Bunge, 1985), the
ontological sphere (Bunge, 1983a), the axiological sphere (Bunge, 1989, 1996)
and the ethical sphere (Bunge, 1989). Systemic thinking makes a clear distinction
between intention and behaviour. Intention is something that should be under-
stood, whereas behaviour is something that should be explained. To understand
an intention we must study the historical factors, situations and contexts, as well
as the expectation mechanisms. Behaviour must be explained with respect to the
context, relationships and situation in which it unfolds. What implication does
the distinction between intention and behaviour have for the study of social
systems?
Interpretation of meaning is an important part of the intention aspect in the
distinction. Explanation and prediction become an essential part of the beha-
vioural aspect of the distinction.
In systemic thinking it is the link between the interpretation of meaning and
explanation, and prediction, that provides historical and social sciences with
practical strength. By making a distinction between intention and behaviour, the
historical and the social sciences are interpretive, explanatory and predictive
projects. According to systemic thinking, many of the contradictions in the
historical and social sciences spring from the fact that a distinction is not made
between intention and behaviour. The problem of the historical and social
sciences is that the actors who are studied both have intentions and exercise
types of behaviour; however, this isn’t problematic as long as we make a
distinction between intention and behaviour. By simultaneously introducing the
distinction between intention and behaviour, systemic thinking has made it
possible to identify, for instance, partial explanations for each of two main
epistemological positions, namely the naturalists and the anti-naturalists (Johan-
nessen & Olaisen, 2005, 2006), and synthesize these explanations into new
knowledge.
Systemic thinking emphasizes circular causal processes, also called interactive
causal processes, in addition to linear causal processes (Johannessen, 1996,
1997). Systemic thinking argues that, to understand objective social facts, one
must examine their subjective aspects. In systemic thinking, objective social facts
exist, but they are often more difficult to grasp than facts in the natural world,
because social facts are often influenced by expectations, emotions, prejudices,
ideology, and economic and social interests. ‘Aspect-seeing’ is thus a way of
approaching these social facts.
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Emergents are central to systemic thinking. A pattern behind the problem or
phenomenon is always sought in systemic investigations. Patterns may be
revealed by studying the underlying processes that constitute a phenomenon or
problem, and the search for pattern is what scientific research is all about
(Bunge, 1996: 42).
According to systemic thinking it is a misconception to say that the facts are
social constructions. The misunderstanding involves confusing our concepts
about facts and our hypotheses about the facts together with the facts. Our
concepts and hypotheses are mental constructs, but the facts are not mental
constructs. Social need, for instance, is not a social fact; it is a mental construct
of, for instance, starvation. Starvation is a social fact. Social need is a mental or
social construction. Not being able to read is a social fact. Illiteracy is, however,
a social construction.
A symbol should symbolize something, just as a concept should delineate
something. A hypothesis should explain something or express something about
relationships. A conceptual model should say something about the relationships
between concepts. A theory should say something about relationships between
propositions. Physical or social facts are untouched by all these mental construc-
tions. That one can change social facts through constructs, or that social facts are
changed as a social consequence of using constructs, is neither original nor new.
The aim of theoretical research, according to the systemic position, is the
construction of systems, i.e. theories (Bunge, 1974: v). The order in systemic
research is thus: theory–analysis–synthesis.
In the methodological sphere, the systemic position has its main focus on
relationships, in terms of concrete things, ideas and knowledge. Consequently,
systemic thinking encourages interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches
to problems or phenomena.
The systemic position thus attempts to bridge the gap between methodological
individualism and methodological collectivism, which is considered the classic
controversy in historical and social sciences.
The perceptions that an observer has about social systems will influence his or
her actions, regardless of whether the perceptions are true or fallacious. Systemic
investigations, writes Bunge, therefore start ‘from individuals embedded in a
society that preexists them and watch how their actions affect society and alter it’
(Bunge, 1996: 241). For these reasons the study of social systems from a
systemic perspective always includes the triad: actors–observers–social systems.
An observer tries to uncover a system’s composition, environment and struc-
ture. Then the actors’ subjective perception of composition, environment and
structure is examined. In other words, both the subjective and the objective
aspects are studied. When we wish to study changes in social systems, from a
systemic point of view, we have to examine the social mechanisms (drivers) that
influence changes; both internal and external social mechanisms must be identi-
fied. This study takes place within the four subsystems: economic, political,
cultural and relational. According to systemic thinking, social changes occur
along seven axes:
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1. As an expectation of new relationships, values, power constellations, tech-
nologies and distribution of material resources;
2. As a result of our beliefs (mental models) about relationships, values, power
constellations, technical and material resources;
3. As a result of psychological elements, such as: irritation, crisis, discomfort,
unsatisfactory life, unworthy life, loss of well-being, etc.;
4. As a result of communication in and between systems;
5. As a result of an understanding of connections (contextual understanding);
6. As a result of learning and new self-knowledge;
7. As a result of new ideas and ways of thinking.
Historiography, from a systemic perspective, has one clear goal: to investigate
what happened, where it happened, when it happened, how it happened, why it
happened and with what results.
Systemic assumptions related to historiography and social sciences may be
expressed in the following (Bunge, 1998: 263):
a. The past has existed;
b. Parts of the past can be known;
c. Every uncovering of the past will be incomplete;
d. New data, techniques, and systemizations and structuring will reveal new
aspects of the past;
e. Historical knowledge is developed through new data, discoveries, hypotheses
and approaches.
In systemic thinking, if changes are to take place, then the material will some-
times be given precedence; at other times, ideology, ideas and thinking are given
precedence. In other contexts, there is a systemic link between the material and
ideas that are needed to bring about changes. In such contexts, it is difficult and
irrelevant to say what the primary driver is, i.e. the material or ideas; this would
be on a par with discussing what came first, the chicken or the egg.
The processes that drive social change, according to a systemic perspective, are
the interaction of the economic, political, relational and cultural subsystems. In some
situations, one of these four perspectives will prevail, whereas in others it will be one
or more of the four subsystems that are the drivers of social change. In many cases, it
is precisely the interaction between the four subsystems that leads to social changes.
In this context the systemic perspective may be described by saying that material
conditions/energy, such as economic relationships, may provide the ground from
which ideologies develop, but that these ideologies in return influence the develop-
ment of the material. Whether material conditions/energy or ideology comes first is
often determined by a historiographical punctuation process (Bateson, 1972: 163).
The systemic perspective balances historical materialism and historical ideal-
ism. It assumes that overall social changes are the result of economic, political,
social and cultural factors, in addition to the interaction between material
conditions/energy and ideas. Furthermore, a systemic perspective views any
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society as being interwoven into its surroundings (Bunge, 1998: 275). When a
historian considers a historical situation – such as the massacre in Van in April
1915 – from this perspective he is trying ‘to throw light upon the internal
working of a past culture and society’ (Stone, 1979: 19).
The systemic position attempts to view the relevant event in a larger context,
in order to find ‘the patterns which combine’ (Bateson, 1972: 273–274), because
‘change depends upon feedback loop’ (Bateson, 1972: 274). Bunge says about
this position: ‘By placing the particular in a sequence, adopting a broad
perspective the systemist overcomes the idiographic/nomothetic duality, . . ., as
well as the concomitant narrative/structural opposition’ (Bunge, 1998: 275). This
means, metaphorically, that the systemic researcher uses a microscope, telescope
and a helicopter to investigate patterns over time.
Systemic research strategy is a ‘zig-zagging between the micro-meso and
macro-levels’ (Bunge, 1998: 277). Through a systemic research strategy the
researcher has ample opportunities to use a Boudon–Coleman diagram.
Systemic thinking examines four types of changes.5
The systemic researcher attempts to explore the interrelationship of the four
types of changes. A single event is not in itself necessarily of special interest to
the systemic researcher; rather, the focus is on the system of events of which the
single event is a part.
Type I change
This concerns individuals who change history, such as Genghis Khan, Hitler,
Stalin, Mao Zedong, etc.
Type II change
This concerns groups of people acting together who change history. Examples of
type II change include the invasion of the Roman Empire by peoples from the
north, and the Ottoman expansion into the Balkans between the late 1400s and
when the Ottoman Empire was pushed back, partly due to nationalist liberation
movements in the early 1900s.
Type III change
This includes changes in history that are caused by natural disasters, such as the
volcanic eruption that destroyed Pompeii. Climate change may also be said to an
example of a type III change.
Type IV change
This involves a total change in the way of thinking, such as the emergence of
new religions, such as Islam, or a new political ideology, such as Marxism.
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All the social sciences are used in the systemic position to seek insight and
understanding, and explain a phenomenon or problem.
Tacit knowledge
This is knowledge that is difficult to communicate to others as information. It is
also very difficult, if at all possible, to digitize.
The knowledge-based perspective
The knowledge-based perspective is defined here as creating, expanding and
modifying internal and external competencies to promote what the organization
is designed to do (Grant, 2003: 203).
The resource-based perspective
This perspective can be defined as the structuring and systematization of the
organization’s internal resources so it is difficult for competitors to copy them.
Theory
This is here understood as a system of propositions (Bunge, 1974: v).
Notes
1 Asplund’s motivation theory, a term we use here, is based on Asplund’s research.
2 Asplund (1970: 55) refers to a similar phenomenon when he discusses Simmel. He
points out that the norms that may have had a positive function during a historic phase
become, in a later phase, dysfunctional.
3 Emergents appear if something new occurs on a level that did not previously exist on
the level below. By emergent we mean: ‘Let S be a system with composition A, i.e. the
various components in addition to the way they are composed. If P is a property of S, P
is emergent with regard to A, if and only if no components in A possess P; otherwise P
is to be regarded as a resulting property with regards to A’ (Bunge, 1977: 97).
4 North’s action theory is a term we use here based on North’s research.
5 The four types of changes are related to Bateson’s (1972: 279–309) work on different
types of learning, especially those discussed in his article ‘Logical types of learning
and communication’.
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